Golden Dawn: Greece's Neo-Nazis — Organizing, Encouraging, Sustained by Violence

Sixty nine members of Golden Dawn are currently on trial in Greece for serious crimes. Can it really be mere coincidence that so many Golden Dawn members are implicated in such serious and violent offenses?

Golden Dawn members and politicians rally outside Greek parliament. Demotix/Michael Debets.
All rights reserved.

By Emmanuel Melissaris
Sixty nine members of Golden Dawn, the Greek neo-Nazi party, are currently on trial – a trial that has been progressing very slowly and has been adjourned three times already – charged with having committed a range of very serious offenses.

Some of them were prosecuted as principal offenders in murders, attempted murders, serious assaults, firearm possession offenses etc. Others, including the leader and his closest circle, are liable for having set up and/or being members of a structured, long-term organization, which pursues the commission of a gamut of specified serious crimes.

Golden Dawn members, sympathisers and advocates vociferously protest that they are being persecuted for their ideas rather than for any crimes actually committed. I have argued elsewhere that this is certainly not the case; this is a criminal prosecution and not a political persecution.

This, however, still leaves open the question of whether there is a necessary connection between Golden Dawn as a party and everything that it stands for and the kind of violence that falls foul of the criminal law. To put it simply, is it mere coincidence that so many Golden Dawn members are implicated in such serious offenses?

As one would expect, Golden Dawn has already taken the line that even if some of its members are indeed guilty of the crimes of which they are accused, this has nothing to do with the party itself. The wrongdoers, the claim goes, are bad eggs, members gone rogue or caught up in the wrong moment. If this claim is successful then the party itself is politically exonerated and ducks a blow that might irreversibly undermine its continued existence.

Some try to rebut this claim by arguing that Golden Dawn’s neo-Nazi ideological orientation motivated the defendants, and probably many others too, to commit the offences of which they are accused.

I take it that motivation here is given its everyday meaning as something that drives an individual to act in a certain way, whether that be an emotional or psychological attitude or an ulterior state of affairs that one wants to see realised. I also take it that this appeal to motivation refers mainly to the hatred that Golden Dawn members harbour against various groups and/or their desire to establish a political state of affairs where such groups will be expunged from Greece.

To get an idea of what Golden Dawn is about, read the report by Dimitris Psarras, who has dedicated decades to recording the activities and development of the far right in Greece.

I am sceptical, however, as to whether the motivation argument accurately captures the strong link between Golden Dawn and violence. Consider the following: Golden Dawn could object that the party does envision an ethnically and racially pure Greece and its members are motivated by that vision but that it does not follow that they are motivated to use violence to achieve this vision.

They might even be able to argue that a party member proven to have committed a crime against a representative of those towards whom the party is particularly hostile was motivated by something else altogether (say, that attacks on members of the LGBT community were psychologically motivated by the fact that the attacker has not come to terms with his own sexuality).

The problem with the appeal to motivation is that it allows much to fall through the cracks because it inserts an extra layer of subjectivity, which is unnecessary. To see why we have to go back to what Golden Dawn stands for.

Recall that the party’s vision is a Greece that is pure of all difference: racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, and more besides. Might this be possible to achieve through peaceful means, say through democratic deliberation and decision-making, as a neo-Nazi might claim?

No, this is unthinkable, because there are certain inalienable rights, which come prior to democracy but also go part and parcel with it. So, even if we can bear to imagine a dystopia in which Golden Dawn holds a parliamentary majority and tries to legislate its vision of Greece, it will have to do so through the violence of scrapping constitutional inalienable rights. This being illegitimate par excellence, any attempt at implementing this programme can only be accompanied by actual, physical and utterly unjustifiable violence against that part of the population that Golden Dawn primarily targets.

But one does not even have to go this far. Democratic practice involves more than simply people casting their vote on polling day. It entails the mobilization of civil society; engaging in dialogue with the community coming together in the public sphere; candidates for office and party representatives being publicly questioned, even held to account not only by those with the right to vote but also those who will be affected by the election outcome, whether they have full citizenship status or not.

Some of these real encounters of flesh and blood people in the public sphere and in public spaces are necessary entailments of the democratic process (either philosophically or legally) and some are contingent but inescapable. But Golden Dawn is based on the rejection of whole parts of the population as bearers of rights, at times even as members of humanity. How else can this neo-Nazi intolerance be expressed other than by excluding certain people from the real encounters that democracy entails or even requires and how can such exclusion not be inescapably violent?

To become a full-blown member of Golden Dawn is to commit to its manifesto and to commit to its manifesto of hatred and exclusion amounts to already forming a conditional intent to commit the violence that the realization of the party programme necessarily entails. There is, therefore, no need to resort to motivation or any other subjective state.

Golden Dawn is an organization of people with an express, if conditional, intent to inflict harm, to violate the rights of others, to engage in violence. What it may be that drives them internally is a separate and, with the exception of mental health related and other such defences as well as aggravating circumstances, largely irrelevant matter.

What bearing might this have in the criminal law treatment of Golden Dawn? In some cases (especially in relation to the criminal organization offense), the formation of this intent is already a substantial element of the crime committed. In others, the commitment to violence provides an important evidentiary indication of the intent to commit the crime.

The most important point is that, although these people are not held criminally liable for their ideas, they are held liable because they acted on both their commitment and intention to engage in violence. This violent disposition is required, encouraged, and organized by Golden Dawn as a political party and, indeed, constitutes and sustains it as such.

Reprinted with permission from openDemocracy.

Greece: Fascists At the Gate — Under Threat by Neo-Nazis

Golden Dawn rally outside of the Greek Parliament in Athens. (Demotix/Nicolas Koutsokostas.
Some rights reserved)

By Conn Hallinan
When some 70 members of the neo-Nazi organization Golden Dawn go on trial sometime this spring, there will be more than street thugs and fascist ideologues in the docket, but a tangled web of influence that is likely to engulf Greece’s police, national security agency, wealthy oligarchs, and mainstream political parties. While Golden Dawn—with its holocaust denial, its swastikas, and Hitler salutes—makes it look like it inhabits the fringe, in fact the organization has roots deep in the heart of Greece’s political culture

Which is precisely what makes it so dangerous.

Golden Dawn’s penchant for violence is what led to the charge that it is a criminal organization. It is accused of several murders, as well as attacks on immigrants, leftists, and trade unionists. Raids have uncovered weapon caches. Investigators have also turned up information suggesting that the organization is closely tied to wealthy shipping owners, as well as the National Intelligence Service (EYP) and municipal police departments.

Several lawyers associated with two victims of violence by Party members—a 27-year old Pakistani immigrant stabbed to death last year, and an Afghan immigrant stabbed in 2011— charge that a high level EYP official responsible for surveillance of Golden Dawn has links to the organization. The revelations forced Dimos Kouzilos, director of EYP’s third counter-intelligence division, to resign last September.

There were several warning flags about Kouzilos when he was appointed to head the intelligence division by rightwing New Democracy Prime Minister Antonis Samaras. Kouzilos is a relative of a Golden Dawn Parliament member, who is the Party’s connection to the shipping industry. Kouzilos is also close to a group of police officers in Nikea, who are currently under investigation for ties to Golden Dawn. Investigators charge that the Nikea police refused to take complaints from refugees and immigrants beaten by Party members, and the police Chief, Dimitris Giovandis, tipped off Golden Dawn about surveillance of the Party.

In handing over the results of their investigation, the lawyers said the “We believe that this information provides an overview of the long-term penetration and activities of the Nazi criminal gang with the EYP and the police.” A report by the Office of Internal Investigation documents 130 cases where Golden Dawn worked with police.

It should hardly come as a surprise that there are close ties between the extreme right and Greek security forces. The current left-right split goes back to 1944 when the British tried to drive out the Communist Party—the backbone of the Greek resistance movement against the Nazi occupation. The split eventually led to the 1946-49 civil war when Communists and leftists fought royalists and former German collaborationists for power. However, the West saw the civil war through the eyes of the then budding Cold War, and, at Britain’s request, the U.S. pitched in on the side of the right to defeat the left. In the process of that intervention—then called the Truman Doctrine—U.S. intelligence services established close ties with the Greek military.

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A New (Order) For Ukraine?: Assessing the Relevance of Ukraine’s Far Right From the European Union Perspective

Protest in support of demonstrators in Ukraine in Munich,
Germany (Photo by blu-news.org)

Now that the EU is ready to embrace the new Ukrainian government, investing at least one billion euros in the ‘revolutionized’ country, it is time to re-investigate the question of far right influence in Ukraine.

By Cas Mudde
The Euromaidan ‘revolution’ will undoubtedly remain one of the key political events of 2014. Most domestic and foreign observers were completely taken by surprise by the events that followed President Viktor Yanukovych’ decision not to sign an integration treaty with the European Union (EU) in November 2013. While the initial demonstrations in downtown Kiev were somewhat expected, few had ever thought that they could spiral so out of control that, just 3 months later, a democratically elected government with one of the most popular politicians in the country was forced out of power.

Euromaidan has also been interesting in terms of the propaganda battle that has been fought in the traditional and social media. As is now standard for ‘revolutions’ in the twenty first century, activists were quick to set up several Facebook pages, Twitter accounts, and other websites to provide their own positive view of the ‘revolution,’ countering the negative reports from the official Ukrainian media and, particularly, the largely Kremlin-controlled Russian media. They were very successful in disseminating their message, in part through networks of sympathizers in the west (including Ukrainian émigré communities in North America and post-Soviet scholars across the globe).

One of the main struggles has been over the importance of ‘fascists’ in the Euromaidan. Almost from the beginning the pro-Kremlin media emphasized the importance of ‘Ukrainian fascists’ among the anti-government demonstrators, and within days the whole uprising was to be portrayed as ‘fascist.’ This was to be expected, as both Soviet and post-Soviet Russian elites have tended to equate Ukrainian nationalism with fascism, linking any and every anti-Soviet or anti-Russian movement to the infamous Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) of Stepan Bandera, which (temporarily) collaborated with Nazi Germany in a misguided attempt to gain Ukrainian independence from Stalin’s brutal Soviet regime.

Feeding Fascism in Greece: The Memorandum, The State of Exception and The Police

Golden Dawn rally outside of the Greek Parliament in Athens. Demotix/Nicolas
Koutsokostas. Some rights reserved.

The factors that contribute to the inexorable rise of fascism in societies, described here, have to be identified, understood and undermined by critical theory as soon as they occur, so that political action can confront them.

By Antonis Galanopoulos and Chris Avramidis
On 18 September 2013 the 34-year-old antifascist rapper Pavlos Fyssas is killed by a knife-wielding Golden Dawn member. In the hours immediately following, many people gather at the location of the killing, and in the following days, vast demonstrations are held in all Greek cities, resulting not infrequently in clashes with the police, who guard the headquarters of the Nazi organization.

These reactions contribute to some dramatic political developments, among which is the arrest of the leader and MPs of Golden Dawn. What caused a sensation on the political scene is that the popularity of Golden Dawn, which suffered a temporary setback together with the murder of two of its members outside its headquarters, nevertheless remains significantly high. Notably, its percentages in the opinion polls are higher than those it received when it entered Parliament.

In an attempt to provide some answers concerning the emergence and evolution of this phenomenon, we will describe the course of Golden Dawn’s rise and stabilization in the political scene throughout the important events of the last five years.

Afterwards, we will try to highlight the relationship of the state to this fascist movement, and the example of the police in particular, approaching this phenomenon as one that reflects the interests of the dominant political and financial forces, which, as it will become evident, have definitely tolerated Nazi activity, if not promoted it.

This interaction between the political establishment and Nazism has been intensified throughout the crisis years, among other reasons, due to the state of exception that has been imposed by successive Greek governments in order to carry on implementing the directives of the memoranda despite popular reaction.

Golden Dawn surfaces
First stop - the area of Aghios Panteleimonas just a few months after the December 2008 riots. The fascists are mainly a reserve army that is mobilized whenever the ruling class realizes that it is losing or is in danger of losing control. This was observed in post-dictatorship Greece for the first time that December. During December 2008, the state, the ruling class, and their organic intellectuals realized in a state of panic that they had really lost control. The dominant power bloc no longer possessed apparatuses of political repression at the neighbourhood level. The state responded by attempting to erect from point zero and experimentally new mechanisms, and the starting point was a problematic neighbourhood. The area gradually transformed into a ghetto and Golden Dawn gained huge control and influence.

While this process was under way, the country was heading for elections on 4 October 2009. The new government of Giorgos Papandreou soon proved to be moving in a direction contrary to its pre-electoral promises, and in May 2010, signed a loan agreement with the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and the European Central Bank. Since then, a violent assault has been unleashed upon the country’s lower and middle socio-economic strata.

In December 2010 local elections were held, where in general, administrative tasks were shared out between PASOK and ND; the picture seemed normal enough throughout the country, except for the Municipality of Athens. There, Golden Dawn, having received a percentage of 5.29%, gained a seat for the first time in the Municipal Council and elected its leader, Nikos Michaloliakos, as an alderman of Athens. The sixth electoral district including Aghios Panteleimonas, had a lot to do with this success, where Golden Dawn gained a percentage of approximately 14%.

The Greek ‘Indignados’
After a year of memoranda policies popular rage increased and the movement of the Indignant broke out in June 2011. This was the first indication that the country’s political system would not hold for long in its present form. It is worth noting that there was no evidence for the widespread idea that the Indignant movement helped Golden Dawn rise in popularity. On the contrary, it seems that its electoral influence during that period, as well as the following one, fluctuated stably between 1 and 1.5%.1 At the end of the summer of 2011, political developments dramatically accelerated. The parades of October 28 were transformed into anti-government marches; on October 31 Giorgos Papandreou announced his intention of holding a referendum on the question of the new loan agreement, while on November 3 he announced his resignation after participating in the G20 conferences in Cannes and the strong international pressure he came under there. This is the end of Giorgos Papandreou’s political career, as in November 6 he effectively gives up his Prime Minister position and five days later the Papademos government is formed. After this point the political map will be completely reconstructed.

The Papademos government and the ratification of Memorandum II in January 2012 constitute a landmark for Golden Dawn’s rise and consolidation in the central political scene. The far-right has already been legimitized with the participation of LAOS in the Papademos government, while its collapse left a large space for Golden Dawn to expand into.1 Two more purely political factors have contributed to Golden Dawn’s ascendancy: first, the centrality of the migrant issue as a central matter of controversy during the pre-electoral period and the continuous operations against immigrants initiated by the Ministry of Citizen Protection, and, second, a widespread senses of loss of national sovereignty created by the fact that a lot of political decisions have been made outside the country.

In May-June 2012, the country was led to double elections where the collapse of the post-dictatorship two-party political system became completely evident. New Democracy achieved a Pyrrhic victory with a percentage of 2.7% ahead of SYRIZA; the old two-party establishment gained 42% and Golden Dawn entered parliament with 6.9%. According to the analysis of fascism in five stages suggested by Robert O.Paxton in his Anatomy of Fascism, Golden Dawn could now be said to enter its second stage, that of the fascist movement’s consolidation in the political system.2
A new political environment

After the elections we are in a new political environment. Immediately following the elections, Golden Dawn’s percentages in the opinion polls increase, and its candidate for Greece’s larger municipality is the preferred candidate. Golden Dawn uses a portion of state funding for humanitarian activities “only for Greeks,” while intensifying violent attacks in the streets of the country.

In June 2013, just a year after the elections, the secretary general of the Ministerial Council, Panaghiotis Baltakos, while talking to journalists, described the scenario for cooperation between New Democracy and Golden Dawn as ‘undesirable but not impossible’, while similarly positive statements about Golden Dawn were made by other well-known members of the government. Then a well-known journalist stated during a TV show that the governing party should ally with a more serious Golden Dawn in the face of the country’s potential exit from the Eurozone.

Even the street violence of these fascist gangs seemed to serve the state rather well at this juncture, since no-one could confuse it with police repression. A few days before Fyssas’s murder, Golden Dawn attacked some KKE rank and file members in Perama. One of the reasons why businessmen were claiming they had to leave the country at this time was the high cost of labour, maintained by workers through their democratic demands. A core source of these demands was the Left in Perama, largely rallying around the KKE. At the same time, the creation of a fascist trade union in the Perama Docking Zone was being widely promoted. It is worth mentioning that violence, in combination with ideological manipulation and parallel labour unions, has historically been one of the main successful tactics of fascist movements. This has also succeeded in neutralizing working class activities in Italy and Germany.3

The ruling class was equally willing to accept the services provided by fascists in relation to immigrants. The assaults of Golden Dawn created a hostile climate for immigrants and enabled government – and European – policy to force immigrants to use repatriation programmes. This is essentially the incitement “to make life hard for the immigrants” made by Health Minister Adonis Georgiades put into effect, while the Captain of Greek Police encouraged police officers in one of his speeches to make “life unbearable” for immigrants.

The leaking of the latter sound recording in the Greek press saw some reaction from Amnesty International, among others, who demanded an investigation into the case.4 But it is clear that assaults on immigrants can also be ‘useful’ if they render migrant workers weaker so that they are able to claim next to nothing from their bosses, not even accrued wages, due to the fear engendered.

This particular course of convergence was violently disrupted after the murder of Pavlos Fyssas, as the government started to suffer an increasing political cost. It was widely held by popular opinion that the police had been present at the incident and did nothing to prevent the killing.
The police’s attitude as a symptom

The government’s good will towards Golden Dawn at a rhetorical level is translated in practice into tolerance or even protection shown by the police to the Nazi organization’s activities. This phenomenon is not something new, as Golden Dawn’s leader Nikos Michaloliakos corroborated when he said: “The fratricidal quarrel of the 1940s brought nationalists inevitably close to security forces. This tactic continued in the 1960s and 1970s. . . . Also, in the logic of the far right, it has always been a fact that security forces are close to national ideals.”5

The examples of collaboration between Golden Dawn and the police are numerous; here we will only mention the most important and recent events. A few hours after the murder of Pavlos Fyssas, members of Golden Dawn were captured on camera attacking demonstrators with rocks side by side with riot police;6 the director for the National Intelligence Service’s surveillance programme on Golden Dawn was revealed to be the cousin of a Golden Dawn MP candidate, while two policemen were arrested among others on September 28 on charges of forming a criminal organization called “Golden Dawn.” Notably, it is estimated that only 1-2% of attacks perpetrated by far rightists seems to have been examined in court.

In short, it is no wonder that Golden Dawn gain high voter turnout in electoral districts where policemen vote. The national average for Golden Dawn was 7%, but in these districts it reached 23.7%, suggesting that the percentage of policemen voting for Golden Dawn is between 45% and 59%.7 Certainly, this is a two-way love affair, as the issues of security forces are highly prioritized by Golden Dawn’s leadership in their agenda.

There are also several reasons historically which place the police alongside the fascists. These include the familiarization with and exaltation of violence on the part of those in power, the criminalization of the weak and the cultural subordination to hierarchy.

However, what needs to be investigated is the overall relationship between the status quo and the fascists, in which relations with the police should be regarded as only one symptom: “The symptom arises where the world failed. . . . [The symptom] is already formed with an eye to its interpretation,” as noted by Slavoj Žižek.8 The hidden meaning, it is argued here, lies in the choice of the authoritarian turn made the government. Authoritarianism has become a foundation stone for the exercise of power.

The dangerous path of the Memorandum
In the fiscal and financial crisis of recent years, we could say that a regime has been imposed in Greece that resembles what Agamben has defined as the “state of exception,” where necessity, either real or fabricated, has transformed the exception into the rule.9

The government now operates through decrees, so-called “acts of legislative content.” It is explicitly stated in Article 44, paragraph 1 of the Constitution that “[u]nder extraordinary circumstances of an urgent and unforeseeable need, the President of the Republic may, upon the proposal of the Cabinet, issue acts of legislative content.” The acts of legislative content issued in 2012 were as many as those of the previous decade combined. Crucial issues of state investments, labour reserve, the reduction of the minimum wage, capital aid for credit institutions, the shutdown of the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation (ERT), and the privatization of Hellenic Petroleum (ELPE), Public Power Corporation (DEI), Greek Organization of Football Prognostics (OPAP), Hellenic Horse-race Betting Organisation (ODIE), Athens Water Supply and Sewerage Company (EYDAP), Thessaloniki Water Supply and Sewerage Company (EYATh), Hellenic Post (ELTA), as well as the country’s most important ports have all been arranged by acts of legislative content.

The government is a political force that has set itself the task of undoing the Constitution and attempting to establish this state of emergency. When the state of exception tends to become the rule, the institutions and balances of democratic constitutions cannot function and the line between democracy and authoritarianism is blurred. Agamben describes the state of exception “as a threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism.”10 As also stated by Slavoj Žižek, the relationship between capitalism and democracy has now been disrupted,11

and the only certainty is that the system if unobstructed will proceed towards the creation of a new absolutist society along the lines that Agamben describes:

We have reached a later evolution of this paradigm, meaning that the state of exception has been disseminated at planet level; therefore it is no use being declared as such. It is a normal state that changes every meaning of politics, because, as the state of exception is the rule, international law and domestic law change completely. . . . This is why today it is not so much the law, but urgent measures, decrees, police. . . . The parliament ratifies urgent decrees issued by the government, which are turned into laws. We can clearly observe it here; the executive power is the one that creates laws.”12

The linking of the state of exception with the right of those in power to be authoritarian in cases they deem necessary was most notably identified by the extremely conservative German jurist Carl Schmitt during the period when the Weimar Republic was being undermined. The state suspends the power of law in accordance with its right to self-preservation: decision-making ceases to depend on any regulatory restriction.13 Carl Schmitt wrote that “no constitution on earth had so easily legalized a coup d'état as did the Weimar Constitution.”14

Conclusion
The fascist movement in its second stage, having already consolidated its position in the political system, can now aim at the next stage of reaching power. Paxton states with some relevance:

[t]hough each stage is a prerequisite for the next, nothing requires a fascist movement to complete all of them, or even to move in only one direction. Most fascisms stopped short, some slipped back, and sometimes features of several stages remained operative at once. Whereas most modern societies spawned fascist movements in the twentieth century, only a few had fascist regimes.15

The murder of Pavlos Fyssas was evidence that fascism will inevitably show at some moment its real, repulsive face, causing a strong social reaction. During the weeks after Fyssas’s murder, the popular movement seemed powerful enough to force the fascist threat of violence into recoiling and the government into retreating on this front, almost completely eliminating their potential collaboration in the immediate future. But this was not however powerful enough to undermine some of the conditions that favour the emergence of the phenomenon. The factors that contribute to the inexorable rise of fascism in societies, described here, have to be identified, understood and undermined by critical theory as soon as they occur, so that political action can confront them.

Notes

1 Mavris (2013: online).

2 Paxton (2004: 23) proposes the examination of fascism in five stages: “(1) the creation of movements; (2) their rooting in the political system; (3) their seizure of power; (4) the exercise of power; (5) and, finally, the long duration, during which the fascist regime chooses either radicalization or entropy.”

3 Poulantzas (2006: 186-189, 219).

4 Amnesty International (2013: online).

5 Psarras (2012: 177).

6 “Police” (2013: online).

7 “Half of Greek cops” (2012: online).

8 Žižek (2008: 110).

9 Spourdalakis (2011: online).

10 Agamben (2003: 3).

11 Žižek, Giamali and Tserezole (2012: online).

12 Agamben (2012: online).

13 Angelides (2012: 69).

14 Qtd. in ibid. 10, 15.

15 Ibid. 2.



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Reprinted with permission from openDemocracy.