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Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts

The Secret, Hypocritical Gay World of ISIS: Jihadi 'Tough Guys' Hide Homosexuality

A man believed to be Abu Zaid al-Jazrawi. (Handout)
A man believed to be Abu Zaid al-Jazrawi. (Handout)

By Tim Teeman
ISIS murdered a 15-year-old accused of being gay but spared the life of his ‘rapist,’ a senior jihadi commander. What lies behind the brutal double standard?

The murder of a 15-year-old teenager, thrown to his death by ISIS for being gay, not only reveals—yet again—the terror group’s murderous homophobia, but also the hypocrisy that exists alongside it.
RELATED STORY: 'Ignore The Rapists' - US Commanders Tell Soldiers in Afghanistan To Ignore Afghan Allies Who Rape Boys
A senior commander of the so-called Islamic State, named in reports as Abu Zaid al-Jazrawi, was having some kind of relationship with this as-yet-nameless 15-year-old, but the more senior man was not killed.

Instead, al-Jazrawi was reportedly flogged, and forced to leave Syria and join the fighting fronts in northwestern Iraq.
RELATED STORY: Women Raped and Enslaved - The Islamic State Dresses Up Medieval Misogyny as Divine Direction
The boy, killed in Deir ez-Zor, Syria’s seventh-largest city, is not the first to be murdered in such a manner: the images of men, accused and suspected of being gay, being thrown to their deaths from tall buildings has become brutally familiar.

On Tuesday, the U.K.-based Syrian Observatory For Human Rights, told The Independent that at least 25 people have been killed by ISIS for being gay: six stoned, three shot in the head, and 16 thrown from high-rise buildings.

Of the 15-year-old’s killing, “The horrific execution took place in front of a large crowd,” a local media activist and an eyewitness told Syrian news agency ARA News.

“The boy was accused of being engaged in a homosexual relation with the prominent ISIS officer Abu Zaid al-Jazrawi,” media activist Sarai al-Din told the agency.

The Sharia Court in Deir ez-Zor reportedly said that Abu Zaid should, like the boy, die for being gay, but ISIS commanders demanded he be sent to fight in Iraq instead.

Subhi Nahas, a gay Syrian who escaped the country fearing for his life, and who in a history-making speech addressed the United Nations last year about LGBT persecution in Syria, told The Daily Beast that there were possible cultural reasons behind the murder of one young man and the reprieve of his older sexual partner, described as the teen’s “rapist” in some reports.

“A tradition in which adult males engaged in sexual pleasure with pre-pubescent boys--ghelman--including hermaphroditic boys, has existed before the creation of Islam," Nahas said. "Because these encounters didn't result in pregnancies, they became more commonplace after Islam had taken root."

The descriptions of the 15-year-old’s relationship with the commander are contradictory: It has been variously described as a “sexual relation” and “rape.” How consensual or coercive the relationship was is unclear, as is the nature of the relationship between the older and younger man.
“Culturally, post the formation of Islam, people related homosexuality to pedophilia,” said Nahas, now an activist with the Organization For Refuge, Asylum & Migration (ORAM). “No distinction is drawn between the two. If somebody raped a boy they called him a homosexual, not a pedophile. Maybe this commander had a kind of waiver given to him by his peers. They think, ‘He does great things for people. We cannot kill him, but we need a scapegoat, the boy.’

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This Is What Synthetic Terrorism Looks Like: Another 'Terror' Arrest; Another Mentally Ill Man, Armed by the FBI

Alexander Ciccolo: He definitely had mental problems.  But the FBI didn't care — he showed interest in Islam and that was enough to entrap him in another FBI-inspired "terrorist plot."
Alexander Ciccolo: He definitely had mental problems.  But the FBI didn't care — he showed interest in Islam and that
was enough to entrap him in another FBI-inspired "terrorist plot." Instead of simply finding a psychiatrist for the man.

By Dan Froomkin
U.S. law enforcement officials announced another terror arrest on Monday, after arming a mentally ill man and then charging him with having guns.

ABC News quoted a “senior federal official briefed on the arrest” as saying: “This is a very bad person arrested before he could do very bad things.”

But in a sting reminiscent of so many others conducted by the FBI since 9/11, Alexander Ciccolo, 23, “aka Ali Al Amriki,” was apparently a mentally ill man who was doing nothing more than ranting about violent jihad and talking (admittedly in frightening ways) about launching attacks—until he met an FBI informant. At that point, he started making shopping lists for weapons.

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Taking Racism Seriously: Islamophobia, Civil Liberties and the State

Racism and Islamophobia are driven by the practices of the powerful. Self-proclaimed 'liberals' need to know this.

Anti-racism march in London. Flickr/The Weekly Bull. Some rights reserved.
Anti-racism march in London. Flickr/The Weekly Bull. Some rights reserved.
By Tom Mills, Hilary Aked, Narzanin Massoumi, and David Miller
We recently held an international conference at the University of Bath bringing together over a hundred delegates to think about how we can research and respond to contemporary conflict and 'terrorism'. We've had a number of responses to the conference, mostly positive (see #iprunderstandingconflict). Several responses and comments, however, have suggested a certain confusion about one of the major themes: Islamophobia. In this article we address some of the issues raised, concentrating on the facts and on what we think are the substantive issues at stake, and in doing so focus in particular on an opinion piece written by the communications officer of the National Secular Society, Benjamin Jones.

On the basis of a single slide from one of more than 90 conference presentations, Jones informs his readers that, 'Much of the conference was devoted to... the demonization of ex-Muslims as "McCarthyites".' Impressed as we are with Jones's confident pronouncement on a conference he did not attend, we think that as the organizers we can speak with more authority. So let us set the record straight. Discussion of 'ex-Muslims', barely featured at the conference at all, save for a passing remark by Professor Deepa Kumar in her keynote address on the 'Matrix of Islamophobia'. One of the slides from that presentation, which seems to be the sole basis for Jones's claims, and similarly overwrought claims made on social media, had nothing to do with non-devout Muslims, or atheists from Muslim backgrounds. Rather the term 'ex-Muslims' was used by Professor Kumar to designate particular individuals and organizations operating in a broader network of Islamophobic groups (particular reference was made to the US group, Former Muslims United).

Another paper at the conference which covered some similar ground and in more detail, but which certainly involved no 'demonization of ex-Muslims', was Dr Rizwaan Sabir's paper on the Quilliam Foundation. As that presentation carefully documented, Quilliam has played an important role in facilitating the repression of politically active Muslims; appears to have more or less taken its marching orders from Whitehall; and fits into a broader historical pattern of non-white groups being utilised as part of counter-insurgency strategy.

The key issues

The key point is that what is at issue here is not religious faith, atheism, or secularism, but racism and civil liberties. The threat to civil liberties, and the civil liberties of Muslims in particular, was indeed a major focus of the conference, and we make no apology for that. This brings us to the central question of Islamophobia. The main thrust of Jones's piece is that what is conventionally referred to as 'Islamophobia' is, in his words, a 'delusion'. He pursues this provocative argument at some length, but is hopelessly muddled. He complains that the term 'is almost always left undefined'. In fact, many definitions of Islamophobia have been offered, and if it often remains undefined, it is only because it has now been widely accepted, albeit often with some reservations. We would happily accept that another word might have been more useful or appropriate to denote the phenomenon described, but there is no need to get bogged down in semantics. Jones himself uses the phrase 'anti-Muslim bigotry', which is fine to a point, but it risks overlooking the fact that racism is not simply a product of ignorance, but a form of political power – an important point of difference we will come to. In any case, we do not see the definitional question as problematic. Just as antisemitism can be defined as racism against Jews, so Islamophobia can be defined as racism against Muslims. Indeed, we use this term interchangeably with 'anti-Muslim racism'.

Jones's objection to this point is the familiar refrain that Islam is a religion not a race. He notes that 'ex-Muslims, non-devout Muslims, or even Sikhs- and others who are mistaken for Muslims' are often victims of Islamophobia. This is correct, but it is not at all clear to us in what sense this renders Islamophobia a 'delusion'. If antisemites target not only devout Jews visibly identifiable through their religious dress, but also liberal and secular Jews, or Gentiles wrongly assumed, for whatever reason, to be Jewish, that does not in any way minimize the problem of anti-Jewish racism. The same point applies to Islamophobia. A similar confusion over race and religion is evident later in the piece where Jones claims that we 'lazily use the phrase "anti-Muslim racism" – which,' he writes, 'makes as much sense as "anti-Christian racism": because in fact "Muslims are the most ethnically diverse" religion in England and Wales.'

The argument here is a common one and superficially seems reasonable enough. Racism is discrimination based on 'race' and Islamophobia is discrimination based on a particular religion – Islam. The problem is that this argument is predicated on the assumption that there is such a thing as 'race', on which racial prejudice is based. In fact, this notion has long been discredited by the natural and social sciences. The notion that humanity is divided into separate races arose out of pseudo-scientific categories crafted at the time of European colonialism, which held that the people of Europe were biologically or culturally superior to non-Europeans. This sort of thinking reached it apogee with the extermination of Jews, Gypsies and other groups in Europe by the Nazis. At that time, 'race science' was taken seriously far beyond Germany, and antisemitism was widespread.

But whatever Nazis and European colonialists may have thought, humanity is not divided into races. There is one human race and within it there are a diversity of people from different cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious backgrounds. The dominant physical marker of difference which is usually taken to indicate a person's 'race' is the concentration of melanin in one's skin, which varies according to one's ancestors' proximity to the equator. What makes physical differences such as this significant (hair and eye colour are also classic racial signifiers) is the political practice of categorizing people into different groups, and privilege or disadvantage becoming attached to these arbitrary categories. This is what sociologists mean when they say that race is 'socially constructed'; it is not an objective scientific category, but is made real by racist practices.

Most significantly for our purposes, racial categories change over time in response to new historical and political circumstances. So certain signifiers of difference become politically insignificant over time, and others become politicized and salient. Once this is understood, the fallacy of the 'Islam is not a race' argument becomes clear. For neither is 'black' a 'race', yet this does not mean that being regarded as 'black' in British society, for example, doesn't impact on your life chances or the likelihood of being subject to violence. There is no 'black race', but racism against black people is real.

This is why Jones's argument about the diversity of both British Muslims and the victims of 'anti-Muslim bigotry' in Britain, whilst true, really has no bearing on the issues at hand. And it is also why in our piece on the 'Five Pillars of Islamophobia' we turn attention to the state and powerful social movements 'from above'. It is largely the practices of the state and the activities of powerful political movements – whether driven by animus or expediency – that leads to violence and discrimination towards people of particular cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious backgrounds; in this case Muslims.

Trivialising the problem

In his effort to demonstrate that Islamophobia is a 'delusion', a 'non-phenomenon' and a 'fashionable falsehood', Jones cites public opinion data suggesting that less than around 1 in 5 Britons have an 'unfavorable' view of Muslims (the previous year Pew found that more than 1 in 4 held an unfavorable view). Jones apparently feels comfortable with 19% of the population holding unfavorable views towards a vulnerable minority. We do not. It is heartening, though, that the majority of the public has not been persuaded by Islamophobic ideas, and we would guess that this reflects the strength of liberal, multicultural sentiment in this country, and the continuing efforts of the anti-racist movement, of which it is a political legacy.

Jones goes on not only to seek to minimise the seriousness of anti-Muslim sentiment amongst sections of the public, but argues with reference to a series of opinion polls that the more significant 'threat' is the 'large minorities (and often large majorities) of Muslims around the world who hold extremely, severely regressive views.' He notes, for example, a Guardian article published six years ago which declared that British Muslims have 'zero tolerance of homosexuality'. It is important to note, however, that this one survey (of 500 British Muslims) focused on homosexuality as a question of personal morality, rather than political rights, and whilst there is surprisingly little research on Muslim political attitudes to homosexuality, it is notable that a US poll on attitudes to gay marriage conducted last year found opposition was significantly higher amongst white evangelical Protestants, Mormons and Jehovah Witnesses than Muslims.

Jones also seems to suggest that anti-Muslim racism in Britain should be overlooked because of polls suggesting support for the death penalty for apostasy in Egypt, Jordan and Malaysia. None of the evidence he presents as far as we are concerned has any bearing on the significance of anti-Muslim racism in the UK, and we can see no obvious reason why one cannot oppose racism and repression in the UK, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia and anywhere else. The only point we would make, and this should be obvious enough, is that one should focus one’s political efforts where they are likely to be most effective, and that usually means seeking to influence one's own government and society, especially where there are free and democratic means to do so.

When citing the various polls about Muslim opinion, Jones adds a series of rhetorical flourishes, imagining us denouncing him as a Zionist, a McCarthyite or neoconservative. If he had read our piece on the 'Five Pillars of Islamophobia', as he has claimed to, then it should be obvious that he would fit rather well into our category of 'left/liberal currents such the pro-war or "decent" left'. Indeed, we consider the new atheist movement as one constituent of this 'pillar' of Islamophobia. We do not wish to rush to judgements about the National Secular Society, but it is concerning that according to Companies House, up until June 2014 Anne Marie Waters served as a director.

Waters has since joined UKIP, started the anti-Islam groups, Sharia Watch and VOICE (Victims of Islamic Cultural Extremism), and was recorded by the Daily Mirror saying: 'a lot of people need to be deported', 'many mosques need to be closed down' and 'immigration from Islamic countries has to stop entirely'. As far as we are aware, the NSS has never condemned these comments, nor distanced itself from Waters, whereas another of her former organisations, One Law For All (OLFA), has done so. Indeed, in its 2014 annual report published in October, the NSS pictured and thanked Waters, and even promoted Sharia Watch’s ludicrous Learning Jihad 'report' in November. In the context of Jones's attacks on our conference as hosting 'conspiracy theorists', this is somewhat ironic, as well as being deeply worrying.

The practices of the powerful

Finally, to return to the opinion polls Jones cites on the public's views towards British Muslims, as we have stated, we consider these figures concerning. But in any case relying on them as a riposte to our argument about the seriousness of Islamophobia is misconceived. Racism is not simply a set of ignorant ideas about a particular group, but a set of ideas and practices which produce disadvantages for particular groups. How far people in different sections of society accept or reject racist ideas is important, but we should not fall into the trap of believing that such views need to be widespread to be effective.

In an unequal society, it is the ideas and practices of powerful people and institutions that matter the most, and this is why we focus on the particular actors we do, rather than on the population as a whole. In the case of British counter-terrorism policy, this has always disproportionately targeted Muslims over non-Muslims, despite the evidence suggesting that the threat from 'religiously inspired terrorism' in Europe is extremely low, and thus is in effect racist irrespective of whether or not it is rooted in 'unfavourable' views. Moreover, counter-terrorism policy has in recent years undergone a shift under the influence of radical factions of the political elite who seek to undermine the multiculturalism of modern Britain.

Understanding racism as a set of ideas and practices embedded especially within the institutions of the state means that effectively combating it entails not just challenging bigoted ideas, but scrutinizing the ideas and practices of the powerful. Naturally such scrutiny is not welcomed. But is regrettable to say the least that the forces of reaction find so many allies among liberals like Jones, who rather than challenging the abuses of our government would rather pen spurious smears about those who do.


Reprinted with permission from openDemocracy.

Retail Clothing Chain Notorious for Bigotry Looses Supreme Court Case Over Discrimination Against Muslim Woman

Abercrombie & Fitch: The company needs to get over itself.
Abercrombie & Fitch: The company needs to get over itself.
By Barbara Leonard
Abercrombie & Fitch must pay after deciding not to hire a teenage Muslim girl because of her headscarf, the Supreme Court ruled Monday.

     Samantha Elauf was 17 in mid-2008 when she applied for a sales job at an Abercrombie Kids store in the Woodland Hills Mall in Tulsa, Okla.
RELATED STORY: Abercrombie & Fitch model tells of 'racism, sexual harassment and discrimination' at store
     Abercrombie calls its sales associates "models," and holds them to a "Look Policy" that involves showcasing the preppy brand. Though the policy prohibits models from wearing black clothing or caps, it offers no definition of the term cap.

     Elauf had worn a traditional veil for Muslim women known as a hijab since she was 13. A friend of Elauf's who already worked at Abercrombie asked an assistant manager at the store whether Elauf could wear her scarf to work if she got the job.
RELATED STORY: Abercrombie & Fitch Supports Racism, Sexism & Size Discrimination  
Noting that a different employee wore a yarmulke, the supervisor said a non-black headscarf would be fine.

     The policy on headscarves never came up when a different assistant manager interviewed Elauf and scored her style as a 6, amounting to a recommendation that the store hire the applicant.

     When that supervisor sought approval for Elauf's hijab, however, a district manager found the headscarf inconsistent with Abercrombie's look policy.
RELATED STORY: Clothing Chain Accused of favoring whites for its sales floor jobs
     Though the woman who conducted Elauf's interview testified otherwise, the district manager later told the court that he did not know he was being asked about a scarf worn for religious reasons.

     The interviewer meanwhile said she received orders to change the score card she had filled out on Elauf, thus ensuring the girl would not be recommended for hire.

     After Abercrombie declined to hire Elauf, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed suit.

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So, What Did the Muslims Do For the Jews?: Islam Saved Jewry — A History Lesson

By David J Wasserstein
Originally published in the The Jewish Chronicle
Islam saved Jewry. This is an unpopular, discomforting claim in the modern world. But it is a historical truth. The argument for it is double. First, in 570 CE, when the Prophet Mohammad was born, the Jews and Judaism were on the way to oblivion. And second, the coming of Islam saved them, providing a new context in which they not only survived, but flourished, laying foundations for subsequent Jewish cultural prosperity – also in Christendom – through the medieval period into the modern world.

By the fourth century, Christianity had become the dominant religion in the Roman empire. One aspect of this success was opposition to rival faiths, including Judaism, along with massive conversion of members of such faiths, sometimes by force, to Christianity. Much of our testimony about Jewish existence in the Roman empire from this time on consists of accounts of conversions.

Great and permanent reductions in numbers through conversion, between the fourth and the seventh centuries, brought with them a gradual but relentless whittling away of the status, rights, social and economic existence, and religious and cultural life of Jews all over the Roman empire.

A long series of enactments deprived Jewish people of their rights as citizens, prevented them from fulfilling their religious obligations, and excluded them from the society of their fellows.

Had Islam not come along, Jewry in the west would have declined to disappearance and Jewry in the east would have become just another oriental cult.

This went along with the centuries-long military and political struggle with Persia. As a tiny element in the Christian world, the Jews should not have been affected much by this broad, political issue. Yet it affected them critically, because the Persian empire at this time included Babylon – now Iraq – at the time home to the world’s greatest concentration of Jews.

Here also were the greatest centres of Jewish intellectual life. The most important single work of Jewish cultural creativity in over 3,000 years, apart from the Bible itself – the Talmud – came into being in Babylon. The struggle between Persia and Byzantium, in our period, led increasingly to a separation between Jews under Byzantine, Christian rule and Jews under Persian rule.

Beyond all this, the Jews who lived under Christian rule seemed to have lost the knowledge of their own culturally specific languages – Hebrew and Aramaic – and to have taken on the use of Latin or Greek or other non-Jewish, local, languages. This in turn must have meant that they also lost access to the central literary works of Jewish culture – the Torah, Mishnah, poetry, midrash, even liturgy.

The loss of the unifying force represented by language – and of the associated literature – was a major step towards assimilation and disappearance. In these circumstances, with contact with the one place where Jewish cultural life continued to prosper – Babylon – cut off by conflict with Persia, Jewish life in the Christian world of late antiquity was not simply a pale shadow of what it had been three or four centuries earlier. It was doomed.

Had Islam not come along, the conflict with Persia would have continued. The separation between western Judaism, that of Christendom, and Babylonian Judaism, that of Mesopotamia, would have intensified. Jewry in the west would have declined to disappearance in many areas. And Jewry in the east would have become just another oriental cult.

But this was all prevented by the rise of Islam. The Islamic conquests of the seventh century changed the world, and did so with dramatic, wide-ranging and permanent effect for the Jews.

Within a century of the death of Mohammad, in 632, Muslim armies had conquered almost the whole of the world where Jews lived, from Spain eastward across North Africa and the Middle East as far as the eastern frontier of Iran and beyond. Almost all the Jews in the world were now ruled by Islam. This new situation transformed Jewish existence. Their fortunes changed in legal, demographic, social, religious, political, geographical, economic, linguistic and cultural terms – all for the better.

First, things improved politically. Almost everywhere in Christendom where Jews had lived now formed part of the same political space as Babylon – Cordoba and Basra lay in the same political world. The old frontier between the vital centre in Babylonia and the Jews of the Mediterranean basin was swept away, forever.

Political change was partnered by change in the legal status of the Jewish population: although it is not always clear what happened during the Muslim conquests, one thing is certain. The result of the conquests was, by and large, to make the Jews second-class citizens.

This should not be misunderstood: to be a second-class citizen was a far better thing to be than not to be a citizen at all. For most of these Jews, second-class citizenship represented a major advance. In Visigothic Spain, for example, shortly before the Muslim conquest in 711, the Jews had seen their children removed from them and forcibly converted to Christianity and had themselves been enslaved.

In the developing Islamic societies of the classical and medieval periods, being a Jew meant belonging to a category defined under law, enjoying certain rights and protections, alongside various obligations. These rights and protections were not as extensive or as generous as those enjoyed by Muslims, and the obligations were greater but, for the first few centuries, the Muslims themselves were a minority, and the practical differences were not all that great.

Along with legal near-equality came social and economic equality. Jews were not confined to ghettos, either literally or in terms of economic activity. The societies of Islam were, in effect, open societies. In religious terms, too, Jews enjoyed virtually full freedom. They might not build many new synagogues – in theory – and they might not make too public their profession of their faith, but there was no really significant restriction on the practice of their religion. Along with internal legal autonomy, they also enjoyed formal representation, through leaders of their own, before the authorities of the state. Imperfect and often not quite as rosy as this might sound, it was at least the broad norm.

The political unity brought by the new Islamic world-empire did not last, but it created a vast Islamic world civilisation, similar to the older Christian civilisation that it replaced. Within this huge area, Jews lived and enjoyed broadly similar status and rights everywhere. They could move around, maintain contacts, and develop their identity as Jews. A great new expansion of trade from the ninth century onwards brought the Spanish Jews – like the Muslims – into touch with the Jews and the Muslims even of India.

A ll this was encouraged by a further, critical development. Huge numbers of people in the new world of Islam adopted the language of the Muslim Arabs. Arabic gradually became the principal language of this vast area, excluding almost all the rest: Greek and Syriac, Aramaic and Coptic and Latin all died out, replaced by Arabic. Persian, too, went into a long retreat, to reappear later heavily influenced by Arabic.

The Jews moved over to Arabic very rapidly. By the early 10th century, only 300 years after the conquests, Sa’adya Gaon was translating the Bible into Arabic. Bible translation is a massive task – it is not undertaken unless there is a need for it. By about the year 900, the Jews had largely abandoned other languages and taken on Arabic.

The change of language in its turn brought the Jews into direct contact with broader cultural developments. The result from the 10th century on was a striking pairing of two cultures. The Jews of the Islamic world developed an entirely new culture, which differed from their culture before Islam in terms of language, cultural forms, influences, and uses. Instead of being concerned primarily with religion, the new Jewish culture of the Islamic world, like that of its neighbours, mixed the religious and the secular to a high degree. The contrast, both with the past and with medieval Christian Europe, was enormous.

Like their neighbours, these Jews wrote in Arabic in part, and in a Jewish form of that language. The use of Arabic brought them close to the Arabs. But the use of a specific Jewish form of that language maintained the barriers between Jew and Muslim. The subjects that Jews wrote about, and the literary forms in which they wrote about them, were largely new ones, borrowed from the Muslims and developed in tandem with developments in Arabic Islam.

Also at this time, Hebrew was revived as a language of high literature, parallel to the use among the Muslims of a high form of Arabic for similar purposes. Along with its use for poetry and artistic prose, secular writing of all forms in Hebrew and in (Judeo-)Arabic came into being, some of it of high quality.

Much of the greatest poetry in Hebrew written since the Bible comes from this period. Sa’adya Gaon, Solomon Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Ezra (Moses and Abraham), Maimonides, Yehuda Halevi, Yehudah al-Harizi, Samuel ha-Nagid, and many more – all of these names, well known today, belong in the first rank of Jewish literary and cultural endeavour.

W here did these Jews produce all this? When did they and their neighbours achieve this symbiosis, this mode of living together? The Jews did it in a number of centres of excellence. The most outstanding of these was Islamic Spain, where there was a true Jewish Golden Age, alongside a wave of cultural achievement among the Muslim population. The Spanish case illustrates a more general pattern, too.

What happened in Islamic Spain – waves of Jewish cultural prosperity paralleling waves of cultural prosperity among the Muslims – exemplifies a larger pattern in Arab Islam. In Baghdad, between the ninth and the twelfth centuries; in Qayrawan (in north Africa), between the ninth and the 11th centuries; in Cairo, between the 10th and the 12th centuries, and elsewhere, the rise and fall of cultural centres of Islam tended to be reflected in the rise and fall of Jewish cultural activity in the same places.

This was not coincidence, and nor was it the product of particularly enlightened liberal patronage by Muslim rulers. It was the product of a number of deeper features of these societies, social and cultural, legal and economic, linguistic and political, which together enabled and indeed encouraged the Jews of the Islamic world to create a novel sub-culture within the high civilisation of the time.

This did not last for ever; the period of culturally successful symbiosis between Jew and Arab Muslim in the middle ages came to a close by about 1300. In reality, it had reached this point even earlier, with the overall relative decline in the importance and vitality of Arabic culture, both in relation to western European cultures and in relation to other cultural forms within Islam itself; Persian and Turkish.

Jewish cultural prosperity in the middle ages operated in large part as a function of Muslim, Arabic cultural (and to some degree political) prosperity: when Muslim Arabic culture thrived, so did that of the Jews; when Muslim Arabic culture declined, so did that of the Jews.

In the case of the Jews, however, the cultural capital thus created also served as the seed-bed of further growth elsewhere – in Christian Spain and in the Christian world more generally.

The Islamic world was not the only source of inspiration for the Jewish cultural revival that came later in Christian Europe, but it certainly was a major contributor to that development. Its significance cannot be overestimated.

_______________
David J Wasserstein is the Eugene Greener Jr Professor of Jewish Studies at Vanderbilt University. This article is adapted from a May 2012 Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion at the School of Oriental and African Studies.

Copyright David J Wasserstein, Jewish Chronicle, 2012



Reprinted with permission from Center for Research in Globalization.

The Shia Crescent: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy — Chickens 'Come Home to Roost' After Years of Bad Treatment by Arab Governments

King Abdullah of Jordan, 2004. Wikicommons/Remi Stinger. Some rights reserved.
King Abdullah of Jordan, 2004. Wikicommons/Remi Stinger.
Some rights reserved.
By Ranj Alaaldin
The “Shia Crescent” has been a self-serving and self-fulfilling prophecy. Since its inception in 1979, never has the Islamic Republic of Iran had such influence and control over a range of state and non-state actors. In Iraq, Iran has unparalleled control over the Shia-dominated state and the country’s range of Shia militias currently fighting so-called Islamic State (IS). Elsewhere, Iranian influence over Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria’s al-Assad regime has been reinforced since the outbreak of conflict in Syria and its transformation into a regionalised sectarian proxy war.

Whilst for Iran it is mostly geostrategic interests that are at stake, for the others it is their survival. IS and its backers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf have made clear their intent to reverse the Shia ascent in the region and eliminate the Shia community altogether. In other words, Iranian influence in the region has as much to do with the policies and reactions of the Arab world as it does Iran’s own maneuverings. Iran does not have influence over the region’s various Shia actors by default, but is helped by the way the Arab world regimes have historically treated Shia actors in the region.

Traditionally, they have afforded little political and human rights to their Shia constituents. They have also treated their Shia communities as part of broader regional problems, particularly because of the religious and political ties that exist between the region’s different Shia communities. These ties do not necessarily mean that they are conducive to some form of pan-regional Shia alliance but, rather, that the Arab world has identified the region’s Shia communities as threats to their authority.

Iran’s influence in the region today is nothing new. Under the Shah, Iran was also proactive, often embroiled in conflict or disputes with the Arab world and often supporting rebel or revolutionary forces, like the Kurds in Iraq. When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ousted the Shah regime and came to power, he called upon the Islamic world to rise up against their autocratic leaders. Whilst some Arab governments, like Syria, Libya and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation sent their congratulations to him, there was unease among the autocratic governments and monarchies of the broader region. Khomeini’s Iran permitted the notion that change and revolution was possible. The emergence of the Islamic Republic and the ousting of the Shah showed that the rule and power of despots in the region was not impregnable.

Similarly, the over-arching and generally simplistic narrative emphasising the link between Shia actors in the region and Iran that we see today pre-dates not only the Syria conflict and the 2003 Iraq war but also the Islamic Republic of Iran itself. Arab world states have historically played on divisions and sensitivities toward Iranian influence; divisions between Arabs and Persians and divisions in Islam between Sunnis and Shias. Anti-government opposition figures, and Shia political movements more generally, have often, if not always, been charged with accusations of being Iranian agents. Under Saddam Hussein and his predecessors, the Iraqi state regularly accused its Shia community of being an Iranian fifth column.

Like the 1979 Iranian revolution, the 2003 invasion of Iraq had an instant impact on the sectarian polarisation of the region. In perception, the empowerment of Iraq’s Shia community after 2003 was seen as the empowerment of the Arab world’s other marginalised Shia communities. In much the same way as the Iranian revolution had done in 1979 (although for both Shia and Sunni Arabs), the removal of the Baath regime and the fall of Saddam Hussein seemed to promise the deliverance of the Shia as a whole.

The Shias’ dominance in the new Iraq also concerned the rest of the region because of the considerable extent to which they were organized and mobilized on the basis of their Shia identity. Arab world regimes have historically sought to project, through both coercive and non-coercive means, a vision and image of unity in their effort to legitimize their rule and contain internal dissent. Iraq after 2003, like the Iranian revolution in 1979, has undermined this projection. Further, Iraq’s Shia actors entered the new Iraq with extensive links to Iran, which gave Iraq’s Shia opposition groups, as well as Kurdish groups, extensive support in their effort to overthrow the Baath regime.

The toppling of the Baath regime could have triggered the same sentiments, moreover, as the 1979 Iranian revolution, for the region as a whole, and indeed echo those sentiments triggered by the Arab Spring protests, among a population yearning for democratic and human rights. However, the toxic circumstances that followed the toppling of the Baath regime; the backdrop against which the war took place and the Arab world’s immediate mobilisation against the new Iraq, before it was given a chance to repair and rebuild, as well as the narrative that came from Sunni Arab actors in Iraq and beyond, ensured that the fall of Saddam Hussein was seen as the fall of the Sunnis and the rise of the Shia and Iran.

When King Abdullah of Jordan referred to the dangers of a “Shia crescent” in December 2004, one stretching from Damascus to Tehran, passing through Baghdad, the definition of the Iraqi state was still unclear at the time and it was equally unclear whether Iraq would come to be ruled by a Shia alliance. Yet, Iraq’s neighbours in the Arab world had already decided to characterize the new Iraq as an Iranian client-state; its Shia parties, Iranian proxies. In other words, the post-2003 Iraq did not have to exacerbate sectarianism and polarise the region further along sectarian lines. But in response to this characterisation, a flood of jihadists used the Arab world states as a transit point to enter Iraq and wreak carnage, with the acquiescence of the governments of those states. Militants received active support from either Arab world governments or wealthy individuals from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

As the trajectory of the post-2003 Iraq shows, it was in response to the Sunni mobilisation against the new Iraq that the Shias contested elections as a unified bloc, despite their ideological, political and social divisions. This came in 2005, when Grand Ayatollah Sistani brought Iraq’s Shia parties and movements together in order to ensure that a resilient Sunni insurgency, backed by the Arab world, did not take them back under Baathist or Sunni Arab dictatorial rule, which cross-sections of Iraq’s Shia community feared at the time. As one Iraqi Shia noted to me in 2007: “I would much rather live in a jungle than a Baathist prison”, referring to the chaos and the civil war that had engulfed the country at the time.

Shunned by the Arab world, Iraq’s Shia-dominated state was effectively pushed into Iran’s orbit of influence after 2003. More recently, Iran was the only outside power that deployed advisors and special-forces in the country in June 2014, when IS took control of Mosul. While the west dithered as Iraq’s capital, Baghdad, was being targeted by IS, Iran responded almost immediately to a threat that threatened the Iraqi state and the Shia community itself. Iranian support has manifested itself in the form of arms and funds; organisational and technical assistance. That, inevitably, translates into some form of influence and control.

The post-2003 Sunni Arab rejection of the new Iraq; followed by the sectarian proxy war in Syria and the anti-Shia basis on which IS functions and on which the Arab world states legitimise and strengthen their rule, has created a unifying thread that mobilizes and unites the Shia, despite their own internal divisions. In other words, any Shia dependence on Iran, whether this occurs in Iraq, or Syria – where the Shia Allawite sect is traditionally seen as heretic by most Shias – or in Yemen – where the Houthis belong to a sect of Shia Islam (Zaydism) that is in fact closer to Sunni Islam – is not necessarily a matter of choice or of default, but one of necessity.

This has proved pivotal in bridging the divide that has existed between different sections of the Shia community both within Iraq and in the region. It has also transformed the Shia identity into a powerful galvanising force, particularly since the rise of IS and the outbreak of conflict in Syria.

Shias throughout the region retain a strong sense of their national identity and seldom will you meet a Shia that rejects his or her national identity. But what recent conflict in Syria, the rise of IS and the anti-Shia sectarian narrative from the Arab world has done is to coalesce the region’s Shia community around the Shia identity, despite their political, social and ideological differences. In other words, the notion of a Shia Crescent might be a greater reality today than it was before when first asserted by King Abdullah in 2004. But it has been both a self-serving and a self-fulfilling prophecy.



Reprinted with permission from openDemocracy.

A Bigoted Anti-Muslim Mass Email Was Circulated by an Idaho Republican Leader — Sending Idaho's GOP Into Damage Control Mode

Becky Prestwich (left) says she wrote the email in the name of Doyle Beck.
Becky Prestwich (left) says she wrote the email in the name of Doyle Beck.

By BRYAN CLARK
Muslim leaders in eastern Idaho were deeply offended by Islamophobic statements contained in a Monday newsletter distributed by the Bonneville County Republican Central Committee.

In the newsletter, an article entitled “Islam in Idaho” warns that Muslims are “infiltrating” the state. It claims Muslims have been taught to “be ready to rise up and kill” non-Muslims and to be “two-faced,” in order to deceive people into believing their intentions are good.

The article called on newsletter readers to “demand that our lawmakers and law enforcers pay attention and ascertain whether or not there is a potential threat.”

“Please, don’t wait until something bad happens,” the article later said.

After learning of the article’s contents, Idaho State University professor Daniel Hummel, a practicing Muslim who teaches political science, said it simply is a rehash of conspiracy theories espoused by radical anti-Muslims.

“This is the same garbage that we’ve been hearing forever,” he said.

When such extremist views are espoused by those who have a degree of power, Hummel said, it can threaten the safety of Muslim communities.

“We’re seeing hate crimes go up year by year, and so stuff like this — especially coming from the top of an organization like the Bonneville County GOP — is really disconcerting for us living here in eastern Idaho,” he said. “Vigilantes” could take such assertions seriously, Hummel said, and commit hate crimes against area Muslims.

Bonneville GOP chairman Doyle Beck said Wednesday afternoon that he was “in Texas in a helicopter” and not available for comment. Wednesday night, Bonneville GOP executive director Becky Prestwich said she wrote the article, which is unsigned but appears below a picture of Beck.

Prestwich said she regretted that she wasn’t more specific in her comments. She said the article was concerned with radical Muslims, not all Muslims. Prestwich said she believes that at least 10 percent of Muslims are radicals.

Ibrahim Hooper, national spokesman of the Council on American-Islamic Relations — the largest Muslim civil rights organization in the country — said Hummel is right to worry about such rhetoric.

“What we see is that the level of anti-Muslim rhetoric goes up and then we see a minority of bigots turn that hate rhetoric into violent actions,” Hooper said.

The article specifically attacked the Council on American-Islamic Relations, which Prestwich characterized as a front group in an interview with the Post Register.

“Muslims are taught to be ‘two faced,’” the article said, “that is, to present the face of friendship to enemies but to inwardly hate them. To wait to be called to jihad and be ready to rise up and kill the enemy when called. Given that type of deeply ingrained teaching, are we to take them at their word when organizations like CAIR dispute that there are any nefarious intentions?”

The article also painted Muslims as violent toward other religions.

“There are at least 109 (chapters of the Quran) that advocate violence and death towards infidels,” the article said. “And make no mistake; if you are not a Muslim, you are an infidel. Period.”

Not true, Hooper said.

“I’ve been a Muslim for many decades,” he said. “I’ve never heard an actual Muslim use the word ‘infidel.’ The only time you hear that is from anti-Muslim bigots.”

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Fanatical Islamophobe Ayaan Hirsi Ali is a Notorious Liar — Yet Big Media, Big Universities, and Big Right-Wing 'Think Tanks' Love Her

One of America's most prominent Islam bashers has a long history of making things up. Almost everything she has said about her personal experiences with Islam is a fraud and her fabrications even led to the fall of the right-wing political party she was a member of in the Netherlands.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali. (Photo by Steve Jurvetson)
Ayaan Hirsi Ali. (Photo by Steve Jurvetson)
.By Max Blumenthal
While promoting her new book, Heretic, on a March 23 episode of "The Daily Show," Somali-born author and anti-Islam activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali made a staggering claim: “If you look at 70 percent of the violence in the world today, Muslims are responsible,” she told host Jon Stewart.

Stewart did not demand any evidence and Hirsi Ali provided no citation. However, she made a strikingly similar statement in a March 20 essay previewing her new book for the Wall Street Journal: “According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies,” Hirsi Ali wrote in WSJ’s Saturday Essay, “at least 70% of all the fatalities in armed conflicts around the world last year were in wars involving Muslims.”

I contacted the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a leading British foreign policy think tank, to inquire about the source of Hirsi Ali’s statistic. According to IISS Media Relations and Communications Officer Kat Slowe, IISS did not explicitly state such a figure in its research.

“I have spoken to a number of our experts and they cannot identify where this statistic may have come from,” Slowe told me.

“Their best guess is that the journalist in question [Hirsi Ali] may have access/a subscription to the [IISS] Armed Conflict Database and may have calculated this statistic independently. There are some concerns that it could be misleading as, without Syria (near 200,000 total deaths, and almost half of last year’s global conflict deaths) the figure would look massively different (and of course, this conflict did not have its root in religion),” Slowe added.

Hirsi Ali’s AHA Foundation did not respond to my request for a citation on the statistic, nor did the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute that employs Hirsi Ali as a resident scholar. My email query to Hirsi Ali’s personal account at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, where she serves as a fellow, also went unanswered.

[...]

History of fraud

Hirsi Ali’s highly suspect statistic is only the latest deception by one of the world’s most prominent opponents of Islam. While other anti-Muslim activists like Robert Spencer and Pamela Geller have marginalized themselves on the fringes of the far-right, Hirsi Ali remains a darling of the American mainstream media. In Heretic, a polemic recycling many of her past arguments against Islam, she calls for the emergence of a Muslim Martin Luther — the authoritarian 16th-century zealot who called for burning down the synagogues of Jews, whom he compared to a gangrenous disease. With the book's release, Hirsi Ali has been welcomed with open arms by the BBC, CNN’s Anderson Cooper, and a relatively accommodating Jon Stewart. ABC News has even run an excerpt from Heretic, while the New York Times Book Review hosted her for an interview filled with hardball questions about her favorite children’s books.

Hirsi Ali’s power to persuade lies in her dramatic personal story and the public persona she has constructed. She has marketed herself as a expert native informant who has emerged out of the dark heart of radical Islam and into the light of Western civilization. Her tale is an uplifting, comforting one that tells many Westerners what they want to hear about themselves and their perceived enemies. With anti-Muslim attitudes at their peak across Europe and the US, her sweeping critique of Islam as an endemically violent faith has enormous cachet. The only problem is that like her writings on Islam, much of what she has told the public about herself is questionable.
In May 2006, the Dutch television program Zembla thoroughly debunked the dramatic story Hirsi Ali had told to advance her career, concluding that Hirsi Ali had sold the Dutch public “a story full of obscurities.”

Born Ayaan Hirsi Magam, she migrated to the Netherlands in 1992, changed her name to Hirsi Ali, and lied to Dutch authorities about her past. Contrary to the story she told the government, she arrived in the Netherlands not from war-torn Somalia, but from Kenya, where she lived in a secure environment and under the protection of the United Nations, which funded her education at a well-regarded Muslim girls’ school. Though she told immigration authorities and the Dutch public she had fled from civil war in Somalia, she left that country before its war broke out. Indeed, she did not live through a war there or anywhere else. Thanks to her fabrications, Hirsi Ali received political asylum in just five weeks.

Hirsi Ali told astonished audiences on Dutch talk shows that her supposedly devout family had forced her to marry a draconian Muslim man, that she had not been present at her own wedding, and that her family had threatened to kill her for offending their religious honor. However, Zembla told a drastically different story. Hirsi Ali’s brother, aunt and former husband each testified that she had indeed been present at her wedding. It turned out that Hirsi Ali’s mother had sent her brother to a Christian school, not exactly an indication of Islamic fanaticism.

“Yeah, I made up the whole thing,” Hirsi Ali admitted on camera to a Zembla reporter who confronted her with her lies. “I said my name was Ayaan Hirsi Ali instead of Ayaan Hirsi Magan. I also said I was born in 1967 while I was actually born in 1969.”

Hirsi Ali’s claim of honor killing threats also appears to be empty; she remained in touch with her father and aunt after she left her husband. In fact, her husband even came to visit her in the Dutch refugee center where she lived after leaving him. Even though he had paid her way to Europe on the grounds that she would join him in Canada, Hirsi Ali’s husband consented to the divorce she sought. (Watch the full Zembla program on Hirsi Ali.)

Fabrications that toppled a government

In 2003, just a decade after gaining political asylum in the Netherlands, Hirsi Ali was elected to the Dutch parliament on the ticket of the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy. VVD leadership knew that the story Hirsi Ali told on her immigration forms was a gigantic lie — she had told them as much — but covered up the fraud and even advanced it to propel her career.

“She’s witnessed five civil wars in her youth, and has fled with her family many times. She’s made of iron and steel,” the VVD’s Neelie-Smit Kroes said of Hirsi Ali at the time, reciting claims her party knew were false.

A year after joining the Dutch parliament, where she said she attempted to ban Islamic schools in the Netherlands, Hirsi Ali teamed up with Dutch director Theo van Gogh to produce a documentary called Submission. The film portrayed violence against women in Muslim communities as a logical result of Islamic belief, relying on actresses to portray abused women and featuring semi-nude, niqab clad women with Quranic verses scrawled across their torsos. Van Gogh, a filmmaker and columnist who had taken to calling Muslims “goat fuckers,” was gunned down and stabbed to death soon after the film’s release by a Dutch Islamist radical. Before fleeing the scene, the killer pinned a note to van Gogh’s body threatening Hirsi Ali with death. Hirsi Ali’s persistence in the face of the episode helped earn her hero status across the West, particularly in post-9/11 America, where Time magazine named her one of its 100 Most Influential People in 2005.

Zembla’s revelations of Hirsi Ali’s lies in May 2006 interrupted her ascent and threw the Dutch government into chaos. No one was more damaged than her friend and close party ally, Immigration Minister Rita Verdonk. Nicknamed “Iron Rita” for her ruthless anti-migrant crackdowns and her demagogic appeals to xenophobia, Verdonk was shamed by the revelations of Hirsi Ali’s deceptions. When she announced her intention to strip Hirsi Ali of her citizenship, however, she was skewered in parliament and forced to relent.

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Republicans Will Be Running Racist Trash for President — Again: ‘I don’t know’ if Obama is Christia'n Says Wisconsin Governor

Translation: I'm a racist white Republican who has to say racist things like this to get votes from other racist white Republicans.
Scott Walker - Governor of Wisconsin. (Illustration by DonkeyHotey)

By Adam Howard
Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker, a potential contender for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination, told the Washington Post on Saturday: “I don’t know” if President Barack Obama is a Christian.

Walker who is currently in Washington attending the winter meeting of the National Governors Association, told the Post, “I’ve actually never talked about it or I haven’t read about that,” and added, “I’ve never asked him that.”

Despite frequent reiterations from the White House and the president himself that he is a practicing Christian, raising questions about his faith has become a routine talking point on the right.

Since he first ran for president in 2007, some conservatives have suggested the president is a Muslim, the religion of his father’s birth. Many have argued that attempts to express ambiguity or ambivalence about the president’s religious background is part of a thinly veiled racial attack on Obama’s character.

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Islamophobia Backfires on Fox News 'Terror Expert': Lying Pundit Claimed London Cops Enforce Islamic Dress Codes Through Beatings

American author Steve Emerson also claimed there are 'Muslim police' in London who enforce religious dress codes with beatings. He has since apologized. It's because of clowns like Emerson that Fox News viewers have consistently ranked among the 'most misinformed'

Fox News Moron: Steve Emerson is one of the reasons Fox News'
viewers are consistently ranked as the "most misinformed."(Screen
captured from Mirror video)

By Anthony Bond
A terrorism commentator who sparked outrage on Fox News after claiming Birmingham is 'a totally Muslim city and a no-go area for non-Muslims' has apologised.

Steve Emerson, described as a terrorism analyst, also told Fox News that parts of London have a Muslim police force who 'attack people if they don't dress according to religious rules'.

He told the American network: "In Britain, it’s not just no go zones, there are actually cities like Birmingham that are totally Muslim, where non-Muslims simply don’t go in."

Speaking to host Jeanine Pirro, he continued: "And parts of London, there are actually Muslim religious police that actually beat and actually wound seriously anyone who doesn't dress according to Muslim, religious Muslim attire.”

But, as reported by the BBC, he has now apologised and offered to make a donation to Birmingham Children's Hospital.

He said: "I have clearly made a terrible error for which I am deeply sorry. My comments about Birmingham were totally in error."

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Big Media Keeps Calling Paris Newspaper Attack 'Worst in Europe Since 2005' — Forgetting A Pro Christian Terrorist Murdered 67 in 2011

Remembering Victims of Terror–and Forgetting Some Others

From the CBS News website, at least seven hours after it had been pointed  out that the Charlie Hebdo massacre was not the worst terror attack in Europe  since 2005.
From the CBS News website, at least seven hours after it had been pointed
out that the Charlie Hebdo massacre was not the worst terror attack in Europe
since 2005.
By
Here's "former CIA deputy director and CBS News senior security consultant" Mike Morell (CBS Morning News, 1/7/15) giving his expert commentary on the Charlie Hebdo massacre:
This is the worst terrorist attack in Europe since the attacks in London in July of 2005. We haven't lost this many people since that attack.
So apparently Morell doesn't remember the bloodbath in Norway in July 2011, when Anders Breivik killed eight people by bombing government buildings in Oslo and then murdered 59 others, mostly teenagers, at a youth camp associated with the Labour Party. This was actually a deadlier attack then the London bombings, which killed 56.

Breivik said he was motivated by opposition to Muslim immigration, citing in his manifesto (Extra!, 9/11) Islamophobic blogger Peder Jensen on the need for violence to "demonstrate how serious the situation is, and force other Western nations to ban Muslim immigration and pressure Muslim citizens to assimilate or leave."

The ability of supposed terrorism experts to forget major attacks is remarkable (Extra!, 3/10). In Morell's case, it's not hard to imagine why he forgot Breivik's killing spree. Describing the attack on the French satirical paper, Morell said:
The motive here is absolutely clear. Trying to shut down a media organization that lampooned the prophet Mohammed. So no doubt in my mind this is terrorism.
Breivik's motive was certainly not shutting anyone down for lampooning Mohammed. So perhaps, in Morrell's mind, it doesn't count as terrorism?
* * *
P.S. As Ali Gharib pointed out, the New York Times (1/7/15) quoted Morell's claim about the Charlie Hebdo attack being Europe's worst since 2005 without contradiction. So apparently no one there remember Breivik, either. (Though the Times' website did run an AP piece that included the Norway slaughter among other "terror attacks in Western Europe.")



Reprinted with permission from Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting.


'I am NOT Charlie': One of The Cartoonist Had Recklessly Dared Terrorists to Attack Him

"You think I am exaggerating? Check out the caricature which one of the folks who got murdered yesterday had just posted. The text reads: "Still no terrorist attacks in France - Wait, we have until the end of January to send you are best wishes". The crazy person shown in the drawing is packing a Kalashnikov and wearing an Afghan "Pakol" - the typical "crazy Muslim" in Charlie Hebdo's world. Talk about a stupid dare..." — The Saker


Cartoon by Charb (Stéphane Charbonnier) which was published in Charlie Hebdo. Charb was one of 12 murdered by terrorists at the offices of Charlie Hebdo on January 7, 2015. (Photo by Coyau)

By The Saker
Okay, let's be clear. I am not Muslim. I oppose terrorism. I don't even support the death penalty. I loathe Takfirism. I oppose violence as a means to make a political or ethical point. I fully support freedom of speech, including critical speech and humor.

But this morning I am most definitely NOT Charlie.

In fact, I am disgusted and nauseated by the sick display of collective hypocrisy about the murders in France. Here is why:

Charlie Hebdo for the Darwin Awards

The folks at Charlie Hebdo had it coming. Here is what I wrote about them in September 2012 when they published their famous caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed: Worthy of the Darwin Awards, if you ask me. Excellent, the “gene pool” of the French “caviar-Left” badly needs some cleaning". Today I fully stand by my words.

Just a stupid dare?

Let me ask you this: what would be the point of, say, taking a nap on train tracks? You don't have to "agree" with the train which will run you over, but it still will, won't it? What about taking a nap on train tracks specifically to make a point? To prove that the train is bad? To dare it? To make fun of it? Would that not be the height of stupidity? And yet, that is *exactly* what Charlie Hebdo did. I would even argue that that his how Charlie Hebdo made it's money, daring the "Muslim train" to run them over. You think I am exaggerating? Check out the caricature which one of the folks who got murdered yesterday had just posted. The text reads: "Still no terrorist attacks in France - Wait, we have until the end of January to send you are best wishes". The crazy person shown in the drawing is packing a Kalashnikov and wearing an Afghan "Pakol" - the typical "crazy Muslim" in Charlie Hebdo's world. Talk about a stupid dare...

"Spitting in people's souls"

There is an expression in Russian: spitting in somebody's soul. It fully applies here. Muslims worldwide have be unambiguously clear about that. They take blasphemy very, very seriously, as they do the name of the Prophet and the Quran. If you want to really offend a Muslim, ridicule his Prophet or his Holy Book. That is not a secret at all. And when Charlie Hebdo published their caricatures of the Prophet and when they ridiculed him the a deliberately rude and provocative manner, they knew what they were doing: they were very deliberately deeply offending 1.6 billion Muslims world wide. Oh, and did I mention that in Islam blasphemy is a crime punishable by death? Well, it turns out that of 1.6 billion Muslims exactly three decided to take justice in their own hands and kill the very deliberately blaspheming Frenchmen. You don't have to be Muslim or to approve of the death penalty for blasphemy to realize that this was inevitable and that this has nothing to do with Islam as a religion. Offend any group as large as 1.6 billion and sooner or later you will find 1-5 folks willing to use violence to make you pay for it. This is a statistical inevitability.

Are some victims more equal then others?

So 12 deliberately "soul spitting blasphemers" were murdered and all of France is in deep mourning. The media worldwide does such a good job presenting it all as a planetary disaster that many thousands people worldwide say "I am Charlie", sob, light candles and take a "courageous" stance for freedom of speech.

Crocodile tears if you ask me.

The Empire's freedom fighter.
The Empire's freedom fighter.
The fact is that the AngloZionists have carefully and lovingly nurtured, organized, armed, financed, trained, equipped and even directed the Takfiri crazies for decades. From the war in Afghanistan to Syria today these murderous psychopaths have been the foot-soldiers of the AngloZionist Empire for decades. But, apparently, nobody cares about their victims in Afghanistan, in Bosnia, in Chechnia, in Kosovo, in Libya, in Kurdistan, in Iraq or elsewhere. There these liver-eating murderers are "freedom fighters" who get full support. Including from the very same media which today is in mourning over Charlie Hebdo. Apparently, in the western ethos some victims are more equal then others.

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Militant Islam — What's Behind The Rise of Jihadists?: The US Has Bombed or Occupied 14 Muslim Countries Since 1980

Statue of Liberty torches bombing by Ares or
Aristides Hernandez Guerrero.
By Glenn Greenwald
Barack Obama, in his post-election press conference yesterday, announced that he would seek an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) from the new Congress, one that would authorize Obama’s bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria—the one he began three months ago. If one were being generous, one could say that seeking congressional authorization for a war that commenced months ago is at least better than fighting a war even after Congress explicitly rejected its authorization, as Obama lawlessly did in the now-collapsed country of Libya.
When Obama began bombing targets inside Syria in September, I noted that it was the seventh predominantly Muslim country that had been bombed by the U.S. during his presidency (that did not count Obama’s bombing of the Muslim minority in the Philippines). I also previously noted that this new bombing campaign meant that Obama had become the fourth consecutive U.S. President to order bombs dropped on Iraq. Standing alone, those are both amazingly revealing facts. American violence is so ongoing and continuous that we barely notice it any more. Just this week, a U.S. drone launched a missile that killed 10 people in Yemen, and the dead were promptly labeled “suspected militants” (which actually just means they are “military-age males”); those killings received almost no discussion.

Sam Harris and Bill Maher - Chauvinists Posing as Liberals:
They conveniently forget that the murder and mayhem of the US and
other Western countries dwarfs any violence Muslims may be guilty
of.
To get a full scope of American violence in the world, it is worth asking a broader question: how many countries in the Islamic world has the U.S. bombed or occupied since 1980? That answer was provided in a recent Washington Post op-ed by the military historian and former U.S. Army Col. Andrew Bacevich:
As America’s efforts to “degrade and ultimately destroy” Islamic State militants extent into Syria, Iraq War III has seamlessly morphed into Greater Middle East Battlefield XIV. That is, Syria has become at least the 14th country in the Islamic world that U.S. forces have invaded or occupied or bombed, and in which American soldiers have killed or been killed. And that’s just since 1980.
Let’s tick them off: Iran (1980, 1987-1988), Libya (1981, 1986, 1989, 2011), Lebanon (1983), Kuwait (1991), Iraq (1991-2011, 2014-), Somalia (1992-1993, 2007-), Bosnia (1995), Saudi Arabia (1991, 1996), Afghanistan (1998, 2001-), Sudan (1998), Kosovo (1999), Yemen (2000, 2002-), Pakistan (2004-) and now Syria. Whew.

Bacevich’s count excludes the bombing and occupation of still other predominantly Muslim countries by key U.S. allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, carried out with crucial American support. It excludes coups against democratically elected governments, torture, and imprisonment of people with no charges. It also, of course, excludes all the other bombing and invading and occupying that the U.S. has carried out during this time period in other parts of the world, including in Central America and the Caribbean, as well as various proxy wars in Africa.
There is an awful lot to be said about the factions in the west which devote huge amounts of their time and attention to preaching against the supreme primitiveness and violence of Muslims.
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