Obama is NOT the Commander-in-Chief - Pt 2: Military Thwarted Obama's Attempts to Transfer Guantánamo Prisoners (Video)

In the nearly seven years since President Obama ordered Guantánamo’s closure, Republicans have blocked him at every turn. Now a new report sheds light on another obstacle in Obama’s way: his own Pentagon. According to Reuters, military brass have imposed bureaucratic hurdles to keep prisoners locked up and prevent foreign governments from taking them in. Scores of prisoners cleared for release have remained imprisoned for years as a result. We are joined by two guests: Charles Levinson, the Reuters reporter who broke this story, and Omar Farah, the lawyer for a Yemeni prisoner who was cleared for release five years ago but remains behind bars due to Pentagon interference.

TRANSCRIPT:


JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Next month will mark seven years since President Obama’s inauguration. That also means it will be seven years since the president ordered the closure of the Guantánamo Bay military prison in one of his first executive actions. We all know that has not panned out, with 107 prisoners still there. It’s also well known that congressional Republicans are the biggest obstacle, passing a series of measures blocking Obama’s effort.

But now a new report sheds light on another hurdle that’s received far less attention. According to Reuters, the Pentagon has thwarted the Obama administration’s efforts to close Guantánamo by imposing bureaucratic hurdles to delay or derail prisoners’ release. A former official compared negotiating prisoner releases with the military brass to "punching a pillow." Pentagon delays forced four Afghans to spend an additional four years in Guantánamo despite their approval for transfer. The Pentagon has even meddled with the effort to enlist other countries in accepting freed prisoners. It’s refused to provide foreign governments with photographs and basic documentation necessary for the transfer process. And it’s barred foreign delegations from spending the night at Guantánamo and reduced their interview times with eligible prisoners, making the prisoners much harder to vet.

AMY GOODMAN: In one case, the Pentagon refused to release medical records for a hunger-striking Yemeni prisoner to a delegation from a country that was considering taking him. The prisoner, Tariq Ba Odah, remains at Guantánamo today—five years after he was cleared for release.

The obstruction appears reserved for President Obama. While President Bush transferred 532 prisoners out of Guantánamo and faced no political opposition, Obama has only been able to transfer 131 during his two terms. Obama has said he’ll push Congress on closure during his final year in the White House. But Reuters notes, with the added obstacles from the Pentagon, it’s increasingly doubtful that Obama will be able to fulfill his pledge.

For more, we’re joined by two guests. Charles Levinson is a Reuters correspondent who co-wrote this special report on Pentagon obstruction. And Omar Farah is with us, an attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights. He represents Tariq Ba Odah, the Yemeni prisoner who remains locked up at Guantánamo because of the Pentagon’s interference.

We’re going to go first to Charles Levinson in Reno, Nevada. Can you talk about the scope of what you discovered? I mean, this is President Obama’s Pentagon.

CHARLES LEVINSON: Right, yeah. Basically, there is a sort of a deep institutional resistance in the military, in the Pentagon, against closing Guantánamo among a lot of rank-and-file, mid-level and more senior officers. And they’ve been able to use their sort of bureaucratic and administrative control over the Guantánamo Bay detention center to make it difficult to accomplish a lot of the things that need to be done in order to close the prison, such as facilitating visits of foreign delegations from countries who the United States, the Obama administration, is asking to take prisoners that they want to transfer out of the prison.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Well, what about some of those—

CHARLES LEVINSON: In the example of Tariq Ba Odah, for example, a third country that the U.S. had asked to take Ba Odah wanted to see the prisoner’s full medical file. This is a prisoner who’s been on hunger strike for seven years. His weight has dropped from 148 pounds to, I think, 60-something. He obviously needs—is going to need a lot of acute medical care by any country that takes him in, and they wanted to review his full medical file. And the Pentagon said—wouldn’t turn it over and still has not turned over that full medical file, instead just handing in a brief summary. The official reason the Pentagon has given for this is patient privacy concerns. But Mr. Ba Odah’s lawyer has waived those concerns. And I think a lot inside the administration believe that such concerns are really just a pretext for making it difficult to transfer Ba Odah, who I think many inside the military view as sort of still in the fight, since he has been on this hunger strike for seven years.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: But, Charles Levinson, on these other limitations, for instance, this issue of not allowing foreign delegations to sleep over in Guantánamo, when everyone knows what a remote place, how difficult it is to get to Guantánamo, what about this limitation? Why do they—how do they explain that?


CHARLES LEVINSON: Right, this one is one that has particularly rankled certain U.S. officials who are trying to work to close the prison. Basically, these foreign delegations come to Guantánamo Bay, and they want to interview as many prisoners as they’re considering taking. It can be five, six, seven, eight prisoners, and they want to spend time getting to know these guys. Do we trust them? Do we believe that, you know, they really won’t be a threat to us if we bring them to our country? And they need to get to know these prisoners, and they’re encouraged to do so by the Obama administration. And that can take time. And so, if you—so, instead of coming down and spending a couple days, two, three days, interviewing these prisoners, recently—basically, since Obama began his new push to close this prison—the military has put new restrictions on spending the night at Guantánamo. And these are new. I mean, for a long time, foreign delegations were visiting this detention center and were allowed to spend the night. But more recently, they have been prevented from doing so.

And that has an impact not just on the ability of the Obama administration to facilitate these prisoner transfers and close the prison, but it also has a cost on taxpayers, because, at least in one case, the delegation in question had to commute each morning and afternoon from Miami—it’s a 90-minute flight, it’s taxpayer-funded—and that added tens of thousands of dollars in costs in airfare of military planes to facilitate this sort of very burdensome commute schedule.

AMY GOODMAN: Charles Levinson, in your article, you cite Pentagon spokesman Gary Ross, a U.S. Navy commander. He says, quote, "No foreign government or U.S. department has ever notified the Department of Defense that transfer negotiations collapsed due to a lack of information or access provided by the Department of Defense." Can you respond to this?

CHARLES LEVINSON: Right. I mean, it’s not a surprise to see the Pentagon—and the White House, for that matter—at least publicly, putting on a public face of unity and cohesion and not sort of highlighting in their public statements the discord. But that statement certainly did not jive with our own reporting and many, many officials, current and present, that we spoke to, who voiced deep frustrations with the Pentagon and relayed to us that they had indeed conveyed those frustrations to military officials many, many, many times over the past several years.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And were you able to get, in your reporting, any sort of indication from the White House of its frustration with this policy? And why doesn’t the president just, as commander-in-chief, order that this stuff be done?

CHARLES LEVINSON: Right, and I think there has been a movement towards doing that. I know, to—I think, to us outsiders, who aren’t in the White House and in government, it seems as easy as a president just saying, "If this is what I want, this is the way it should be." And the fact that it’s not that easy sometimes surprises us. I think, you know, part of the reason that former Defense Secretary Hagel was removed from office—I mean, there are several factors, but certainly one of them, according to many people, including Hagel himself—was the president’s frustration over the Pentagon’s slow progress transferring prisoners.

And more recently, Hagel’s successor, Ash Carter, was summoned to the White House just before Labor Day and was—you know, for a one-on-one sitdown with Obama, who, according to—people briefed on the meeting told us that Obama gave him sort of a very candid talk about the need to step up progress on this front. And I think, since that talk, there has been some progress. And there is a sense that things have gotten somewhat better, although there are still many frustrations. It is expected, for example, that next month, in January, there will be 17 prisoners transferred out. So, it does appear that as a Obama has sort of refocused and double down his attentions on this and really given this more attention, there has been some—you know, he has been able to make some headway in getting the Pentagon to do his bidding.

AMY GOODMAN: Maybe we can find out exactly what President Obama said to the secretary of defense when someone hacks into his private email account, right? It was just admitted that he was using that on his iPhone to talk with his staff.

Is Barack Obama Trying To Deflect Anger Over Freeing Guantanamo Detainees By Throwing a Former Prisoner of War to the Wolves?

Bowe Bergdahl charged with desertion; defense decries 'lynch mob atmosphere'

Bowe Bergdahl. (Screen capture from YouTube video)

By David S. Cloud and James Queally
Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, who was captured by Taliban forces in Afghanistan in 2009 and returned to the United States in a controversial prisoner swap last year, has been charged with desertion and “misbehavior before the enemy,” the Army said Wednesday.

Bergdahl's defense lawyer responded with a statement asking Americans to "continue to withhold judgment until the facts of this case emerge."

Because of the political controversy generated by the prisoner swap, Bergdahl's case has been surrounded by a "lynch mob atmosphere" in which he has been "vilified," defense attorney Eugene R. Fidell said in a letter to the military official handling the case.

The intense response to the case raises questions about whether Bergdahl can receive a fair trial, Fidell said. He noted that the military has been so concerned about Bergdahl's safety that he is required to have two escorts whenever he leaves the base in Texas where he has been living "to prevent third parties from injuring him."

Bergdahl vanished on June 30, 2009, when he allegedly walked away from his unit after he expressed misgivings about the military's role in Afghanistan. He was captured by the Taliban and held by members of the Haqqani network, which operates in Pakistan and Afghanistan, for nearly five years.
Bergdahl, 28, will face a hearing in the case next month to determine if enough evidence exists to warrant a court martial. The hearing, expected to be at a military base in San Antonio, Texas, could lead to a trial or to the dismissal of the charges, the Army statement said.

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Ukraine Armed Forces Faces Mounting Opposition to Conscription Across Country

Men line up for military draft in Ukraine. (Screen capture from YouTube video)

By Global Research News

The village of Voloka, which is one among many locations in Ukraine where protests are occurring is in South-Western Ukraine within less than 50km North of Ukraine’s border with Romania. It is located in the Chernivetska (Chernivitsi) oblast.

The Kiev regime has lost control of its armed forces.

There is a widespread movement against the draft.

Entire units have abandoned the battlefield in Donbass.

Many soldiers are seeking refuge in Russia.

Some have joined the Donbass militia. (M.Ch. Global Research Editor)

By Gleb Bazov, Slavyangrad.org

We don’t want war, we want peace. There is no need for our men to go fighting. For what? We want peace.

We didn’t raise our children for war, we stand only for peace.

Not at any price we will let them take our children. We will stand up for them now.

Village mayor (Voloka): Do not be afraid, the official stamp shall not be put on people’s applications.

Video: Ukrainian and Russian with English subtitles

Transcript: Down With the Draft! A Protest in the Village of Voloka

Reporter: A third [draft] mobilization wave has started: in Ukraine officers, sergeants in reserve and private soldiers who have military experience are called up on a mass scale for a military service. Currently tens of call-up papers have reached every village and city. Besides men, women doctors are called up as well. Fifty call-up papers came to Voloka village (Glybotsky region), that made the citizens highly indignant. Mothers and wives tear-stained, husbands and sons angered gathered together in order to find a solution. They said they never wanted war, so they will not let their sons to fight.

Protestor: We don’t want war, we want peace. There is no need for our men to go fighting. For what? We want peace.

Protestor: We didn’t raise our children for war, we stand only for peace.

Protestor: Not at any price we will let take our children. We will stand up for them now.

Protestor: Mister Yatsenyuk bawled: “Put a bullet through a head!” – so let him go, why not?! … Instead he wears a white-collar shirt and a tie.

Protestor: We did not want war. Let those, who were protesting at Maidan, go to fight. We did not seek for war. We all are one village, one big family, and we will let take neither my husband nor other’s ones, neither sons nor fathers for war.

Protestor: They have started, let them sort out themselves and leave us alone. Over our dead bodies, we will lie on their way and not allow taking our children. Let them realize this and stop coming here with call-up papers.

Protestor: The citizens called a mayor to the meeting, but he didn’t appear, and a military commissioner came instead of him. After a half an hour discussion, they agreed to write a petition to the Regional State Administration and to Verkhovna Rada. Everybody signed the petition.

Valentyn Glopin, a village mayor (Voloka): Do not be afraid, the official stamp shall not be put on people’s applications.

Major Ivan Vanzar, a military commissioner of Glybotsky joint commissariat: I hope, that the people will be heard, because it is clear, that nobody wants now to go to the ATO zone, where the fights are held. So, we will see how the Verkhovna Rada and the President will hear them.

Reporter: The citizens of Voloka ensure they will not send their men to the army, and they expect the officials to support them.

Reprinted with permission from Center for Research in Globalization.

Egypt’s Deep State Rediscovers Itself

Protesters confront Egyptian police. (Screen capture from YouTube video)

By Amr Osman
It is now evident that the coup has not taken Egypt any step closer to a 'real state' where the supreme authority lies within its elected legislature, issuing laws and holding the government to account. On the contrary, the coup has deepened the roots of the deep state, resulting in an entity that is far from modern.

If there is anything positive in the events in Egypt since the military’s junta against its elected president on 3 July 2013, it would be the exposure of what has conventionally come to be called the 'deep state', which is a result of this deep state rediscovering itself.

Among the various groups that participated in the January 25 revolution – Egypt’s real and only revolution – many seem to have sincerely wished to transform Egypt into a state that respected the dignity of its citizens. In fact, they wanted to restore the state – that is, their state – from a corrupt coalition that had hijacked it for decades and divided it into what looked like a confederation of middle-age principalities. The army has its own principality, a giant economic entity with its own factories, supermarkets, and even recreational facilities. As do the police, who are part of the colossal Ministry of the Interior that, in addition to its internal security functions, provides all vital civilian services such as issuing national IDs, passports, etc.

The judiciary is another principality that the parliament cannot even touch without the permission of its lords. The same applies to Al Azhar University and mosque; as well as to the various, and ironically tremendously rich, Sufi ‘orders’; to the equally rich Coptic Church that pretends it is only accountable to God to evade any supervision over its financial and other affairs; to private media that is run by tycoon businessmen who themselves have their own principality, exploiting Egypt’s workers and monopolizing trade in all the vital industries. Last but not least, the Egyptian presidency is a principality of its own, with a budget no one dares to inquire about, that is of course, if it has a fixed budget at all.

Within each of these principalities, different cantons have different privileges and powers. Military police and intelligence officers, for example, have powers and access to benefits other military counterparts envy. A senior police officer in the traffic department within the Ministry of the Interior is no match for a young officer in State Security. Within the judiciary, judges in the State Council may feel resentful towards their arrogant and privileged counterparts in the Supreme Constitutional Court.

This applies to all other principalities, where you always find the powerful and the less powerful; the privileged and the less privileged. But what is common among all these principalities is that they all reject the interference of any outside institution in what they regard as their own domains. This, as it turned out after the revolution, applies to even an elected parliament, as well as the various state bodies put in charge of monitoring the activities of public and private institutions and supposedly fighting corruption.

These various principalities have taken their present shape only gradually as autonomous principalities since the 1950s (many of them did of course already exist, but they were significantly reconstituted after the army’s 1952 coup). Their relationship was determined in a largely ad-hoc manner. At a certain point after their takeover in 1952, the army, as the head of state, was able to exercise a great deal of authority over various state and non-state institutions. In the 1960s they were able to undermine the authority and independence of Al Azhar, the judiciary, private businesses and mass media. In the early 1980s, their second representative (Sadat) felt he had the power even to remove the Pope of the Coptic Church himself – supposedly divinely chosen and appointed – and arrest almost everyone who dared challenge his authority. His policies also gave rise to a new class of businessmen, and the National Democratic Party (NDP) began to assume the role of a moderator to moderate the interests of the various institutions and forces that made up the ruling regime.

Under the army’s third representative in the presidency (Mubarak), each of these institutions began to reassert itself over a long period of time, engaging in a long and mostly silent (but at times turbulent) negotiation with other institutions. However, they never had the opportunity to 'sit down' together to demarcate their respective domains and agree on how to deal with any possible outside threats.

This was well-known before the January revolution. People talked about the “deep state,” even if that exact term was not used. Such awareness was tacitly evident in simple but strongly indicative sayings that Egyptians commonly deployed before the revolution, and particularly when they felt like outsiders in their own country; helpless when the ‘father’ (Mubarak), for example, was grooming his son (Gamal) to ‘inherit the property’ (Egypt). Why not, Egypt is their principality. “It’s their country,” Egyptians used to say.

With the fall of Mubarak in 2011, therefore, Egyptians – ordinary Egyptians who are not part of any principality – felt for the first time that Egypt was theirs, that they were not helpless anymore, and that they could determine their own future by electing their own leaders and their own representatives. This was the real cause of the euphoria that followed the revolution. It was a strong feeling of empowerment following a long period of fear, helplessness, and indifference.

In the interim period between the revolution in 2011 and the coup two and half years later, the principalities of the old state maintained a low profile. The army, now officially in charge, was in the forefront of events, of course. But the events of those years made it clear that their popularity and influence among the Egyptians (which rests on various myths of different kinds) could deplete in a matter of months. Very soon the military realised that things could get out of control and, in their perspective, they did. For the first time since 1952, a civilian became the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, one whose legitimacy came from elsewhere, who expected military obedience from senior military leaders and was brave enough to attempt to sack senior officials to make political gains, and more seriously, could ask questions about an empire that has insightfully been described as a “black box in a black room.”

This ‘non-sense’ had to be stopped, all in the name of national security, and allegedly of saving Egypt from a global conspiracy to sabotage the country in which even world leaders were involved, along with their “internal traitors” and “terrorists”. But the events prior to the election of a civilian president must have made it equally clear to the military that if they wanted to regain control, they would have to rebuild the old coalition of principalities, but now on more conscious grounds, where every principality knows its rights and duties. This is exactly what was going on in Egypt after its revolution; the coup itself was just its culmination.

Admittedly, we do not know exactly when the Egyptian military began to orchestrate the coup or with whom. It is unlikely that the President of the Supreme Court (the judiciary), the Sheikh of Al Azhar and the Orthodox Patriarch (the institutions of the “religious establishment”), the Salafi leader, the journalists (mass media), and the “liberal” politicians (liberal and secular forces) were summoned on the day of the coup to show their full support. These representatives of many of the old principalities had very likely been communicating and negotiating for months. And most likely, they were not just negotiating over whether a coup might succeed or not, but also over how the deep state would be restructured and reconstituted in the post-coup era.

All this would be mere speculation had it not been for the events of the last twelve months. A mere glance over the new Egyptian constitution (and the composition of the committee that produced it) and the presidential decrees – issued by the un-elected, army-appointed interim president (Mansour), who is the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court, and who also held both executive and legislative powers, just as his present successor does – suffices to demonstrate the point. The constitution now recognises the virtual autonomy of the judiciary and the army, with the elected president of the republic stripped from his previous military leadership rights (this, of course, becomes irrelevant when a military leader is the president). Many presidential decrees gave the army ownership or management of various lucrative and vital projects, including real estate, high-ways, as well as entire sea ports.

Other decrees have weakened the ability of the Egyptian judiciary and legislature to protect the Egyptian economy from the abuses of domestic and foreign businesses. And we must not forget the decrees that have nearly outlawed protests or criminalised entire groups of political forces in an attempt to eliminate any potential future threats. These are only examples, but almost every single presidential decree from July 2013 to June 2014 has empowered old institutions and weakened “outsider” institutions, groups, or individuals.

This is all we can see for the time being. What appears to be certain, is that the institutions of the old, deep state have become ‘conscious’, both of themselves as separate entities within the state (to the extent we can talk about a state in this context), and of their inter-dependence. Yet as much as this consciousness seems to have strengthened these institutions (to the extent that they successfully orchestrated a counter-revolution with popular support), it may also trigger their undoing.

Each one of these institutions now has both expectations and what they regard as their entitlements for their role in the coup. It is not unlikely that these institutions – whose relationships are based on purely pragmatic calculation but who are otherwise worlds apart – could fail to continue in balancing their respective interests and the interests of the entire coalition that brought Egypt back to square one. This does not necessarily mean that all of them will collapse, but it means that at least some of them will collapse or simply concede to the power of others in a hierarchy of authority, power, and privileges.

Whatever the circumstance, it is now evident that the coup has not taken Egypt any step closer to being a 'real state' where the supreme authority lies within its elected legislature, issuing laws and holding the government to account. On the contrary, the coup has deepened the roots of the deep state, resulting in an entity that is far from modern.

Reprinted with permission from openDemocracy.

Egypt: Massive Protests That Set Groundwork for Military Coup Were Orchestrated By Egypt's Military — Says Key Protest Leader Who Claims Protests Were Manipulated From Beginning

Military Helicopters Fly Over Tahrir Square With Egyptian Flags: The military
used displays like this to demonstrate support for the protesters who demanded ouster
of Egypt's president Morsi just before the military coup. (Screen capture from YouTube
video)

For the first time, one of the five founders of the Tamarod, the movement that led the protests that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood last year, admits his movement was taking orders from the army. “We were naive, we were not responsible.”

By Sheera Frenkel and Maged Atef
On the night of July 3, 2013, Moheb Doss stood looking at his television set in disbelief as a statement was read in his name on national television.

The words coming out of the presenter’s mouth bore no resemblance to the carefully drafted statement that Doss, one of the five co-founders of the Tamarod, or Rebel, movement had helped draft hours earlier. It was a statement to mark the moment of Tamarod’s victory, as the protests the group launched on June 30 led to the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood government just five days later. It was a statement, Doss said, that the group hoped would have a stabilizing effect on the Egyptian public, as it called for a peaceful transition toward a democratic path.

Instead, the presenter quoted Tamarod as calling for the army to step in and protect the people from “brute aggression” by terrorists during potentially turbulent days. The statement supported the army’s forcible removal and arrest of Brotherhood leader and then-President Mohamed Morsi, and dismissed charges that what was happening was a coup.

“What we drafted was a revolutionary statement. It was about peace, and going forward on a democratic path,” Doss told BuzzFeed. “What was read was a statement that could have been written by the army.”

For five days, millions of Egyptians had taken to the streets and demanded an end to the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. Their numbers surpassed even the wildest expectations of Tamarod, a then-largely unknown group that organized the protests. The five founders became instant celebrities, and on the night of July 3, the moment it appeared their victory was imminent, all of Egypt’s television stations had turned to them for a statement on what would happen next.

“What state TV read was as if it had been written by the army, it threatened the Brotherhood, told them they would use force if necessary,” Doss said. “I was shocked. I understood then that the movement had completely gotten away from us.”

It was, he realized later, the end of a process that began weeks earlier, in which the army and security officials slowly but steadily began exerting an influence over Tamarod, seizing upon the group’s reputation as a grassroots revolutionary movement to carry out their own schemes for Egypt.

“What they did, they did in our names because we let them,” said Doss, who admits he turned a blind eye for too long to what was happening behind the scenes at Tamarod. “The leaders of Tamarod let themselves be directed by others. They took orders from others.”

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Egypt's Military Dictators Tighten Grip On Power: Enact New Law That Criminalizes Protests and Legalizes Crackdown

Protesters at Tahrir Square, Feb. 7, 2011: Egypt's military junta would like to
make such "unauthorized" protests a thing of the past. (Photo: Ramy Raoof)

Egypt's new law criminalizes protest, legalizes crackdown (via GlobalPost)

Enlarge Egyptian police use a water canon to disperse protesters during a demonstration organized by human rights group 'No Military Trials for Civilians' in front of the Shura Council in downtown Cairo on Nov. 26, 2013. A new law passed by Egypt's…

AMERICA'S COMING TERROR DRONES: New Generation of Drones Won't Look Like Jets & Helicopters - They'll Pass for Insects & Birds, Operate Autonomously

By Ronald Jackson
Because of past publicity received by America's drones, most believe that when drones inevitably show up in the skies of their country these drones will resemble mini-jets and mini-helicopters.  In fact, nothing could be further from the truth.  Today's cutting edge drones are just as likely to resemble a roach, bird, horse, dog, or even a human. And plans are afoot to deploy these robots everywhere, including within the United States.

Bird or Machine?: From an Air Force Research Lab Video.

Let's take a look at some of the drone-spy equipment that high-tech weapons corporations are creating and intend to sell world-wide to any nation with the ability to buy. First let's look at "Micro Air Vehicles" (MAVs) brought to you by the 'Air Force Research Laboratory"

According to their own video the small size of MAVs allows them to be "hidden in plain sight." Once in place a MAV can "enter a low power surveillance mode for missions lasting days or weeks." It will harvest power from sunlight, wind or man made sources such as power lines. A swarm of MAVs will provide a 'big picture' point of view of the field of battle.

Tiny 'robot insects' will be deployed as a swarm.

Some MAVs will be used merely for visual reconnaissance, other individual MAVs will perform "direct attack missions" (a bug will land on your head and explode, or inject a deadly venom). The maker of these MAVs sound almost giddy as they brag about all of the potential military applications. These tiny but deadly drones will fly around your local park, sit on your window sill, crawl under the door into your home or place of work, or swim up threw your plumbing. And what happens if your dog or cat eats one of these by mistake?

Watch the video:

Now you are probably thinking, "That's just a video, a corporation's dream packaged and marketed with animations but representing nothing more than future hopes."  Guess again. Such technology has been under development in some form or another for decades now and the technology will be available for deployment as a weapon in the very near future. In fact, we can assume that the military has secret projects that are far ahead of what is being done publicly at universities and corporations.  Take for example the robot drones already operational and programmed to fly in formation as a "swarm" of robots capable of taking off, flying and landing in unison - a literal coordinated team of flying robots.

Watch the video:

Ghoulish geeks have even turned living insects into half-live/half-machine entities under their full control. In this case, researchers at the North Carolina State University have planted circuits into the body of a roach, claiming such half-live/half-machines could be used to "explore and map disaster sites."

Photo from the 'RoboRoach' Surgery Kit.

Really? It's pretty easy to imagine what the military will use this technology for. You can even buy a "insect surgery kit" from a company called Backyard Brains which has been selling kits for turning insects into robots and are now seeking funding for "educational materials" for their surgery kits




Watch the video:

Scientists at the Argonne Natl Lab have been developing robots that are just a half millimeter wide and composed of "micro-particles." These "micro-bots" are  small enough to climb into your ear or nose while you are sleeping; small enough to be placed on your food or in your drink; or perhaps they can be flushed into the water supply of a nuclear plant after which they can be made to perform "certain tasks" before anyone even realizes that "something is amiss." This particular research is being funded by the Department of Energy Office of Science. In this video micro-drones perform a task (picking up a glass bead) at the behest of their giant masters. What happens if (or when) humans lose control of such "drones?" Nobody, it seems, is bothering to ask.

Unfortunately, it doesn't stop there. Not satisfied with robots that can pass for birds or insects, or robots that "swarm" and act in unison, or robots that can barely be seen by the human eye - scientists (Should the word "mad" be placed before the word "scientist?") are developing a wide variety of robots that are capable of "self assembling," like the Pentagon's "shape-shifting robot" that can "fold into a boat or an airplane."

These "smart pepples" will get smaller and smaller.

Such robots are made of "programmable materials" that can create any shape the scientists designate.  One such "shape shifting, self assembling" robot under developing at MIT is "self-sculpting sand" that can "selectively, intelligently" replicate objects. This technology is being called "smart sand." Imagine a "pile of sand" that suddenly turns into a tank or missile, or human-like robot. It should come as no surprise that one of the key funders of this "research project" is the US Army Research Office.

Watch the video:

Here's perhaps the most important aspect of this new generation of drones: What you have seen here represents only the tip of the iceberg.  Try to imagine the kinds of devices the US military and intelligence services don't want you to know about and you begin to get an inkling of what's in store for the future of humankind.